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APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO
THE ACTIVITIES OF INSURANCE
COMPANIES: HEAVIER RISKS,
EXPANDED COVERAGE, AND
GREATER LIABILITYt
EARL W. KINTNER*
JOSEPH P. BAUER**
MICHAEL J. ALLEN***
Since 1945 Congress has exempted certain activities of insurance
companies from federal antitrust scrutiny. This exemption, provided by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, is not unqualified; it only applies to insur-
ance company activities that constitute the "business of insurance" and
that already are regulated under state law. Moreover, the exemption
does not apply to activities that involve boycotts, coercion, or intimida-
tion. The purpose of this exemption was to preserve the long tradition of
state regulation of insurance, while providing federal remedies for coer-
cive anticompetitive activities. The authors examine recent Supreme
Court interpretations of the Act in light of this legislative policy and con-
clude that the Court has unduly restricted the scope and application of
the Act. They urge the Court to abandon this restricted view and call on
Congress to assert its view of the nature and scope of the McCarran-
Ferguson exemption.
In 1945, by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,' Congress conferred a partial ex-
emption from the federal antitrust laws on certain activities of insurance compa-
nies. In brief, the Act provides for the preemption of the federal antitrust-and
other-laws if the conduct in question (1) is the "business of insurance," (2) is
regulated by state law, and (3) does not constitute an agreement to or act of
boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
The availability of this exemption has been restricted substantially in the
last decade. In part this trend reflects an evolution of the insurance industry and
its needs; it also reflects a tendency to construe narrowly any immunity from the
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1. Act of Mar. 9, 1945, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1982)). The text of the Act is found infra text accompanying note 50.
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antitrust laws for special sectors or interests. Although much of this trend is to
be welcomed, in some respects the courts2 have gone too far and too fast in
restricting this exemption-both beyond what Congress intended in 1945 and
beyond the present needs of the insurance industry.
This Article will describe the rationale for and history of the exemption.
An extensive analysis of the three requirements for the invocation of the exemp-
tion will follow. The Article will conclude with a consideration of the interrela-
tionship of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption and the state-action doctrine
articulated in Parker v. Brown.3
I. THEORIES FOR GRANTING EXEMPTION TO INSURANCE COMPANIES
Free competition between the entities in any industry usually is considered
desirable. Because of characteristics unique to some industries, however, com-
petition may have adverse side effects; thus, some form of governmental regula-
tion may be necessary to ensure that the members of the industry conduct their
businesses efficiently and effectively. Many believe the insurance business to be
such an industry.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act attempts to further this goal in two ways. It
provides a partial exemption from the federal antitrust laws for the business of
insurance, and it specifically authorizes state regulation and taxation of the
"business of insurance."'4 To understand the rationale for state regulation of the
insurance business, it is necessary to consider the need for any type of regulation
of the business of insurance; the history of state regulation of the business;5 and
the United States Supreme Court decision 6 that led to the enactment of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act.
Historically, it has been thought necessary to regulate the insurance indus-
try in some way; this regulation traditionally came from the individual statesJ
The rationale for such regulation is that vigorous competition could lead to in-
adequate premium rates and eventually to the insolvency of insurance compa-
nies. This competition would injure policyholders as well as the companies
themselves.8 In the fire insurance industry, for example, the dangers that flowed
from unbridled competition were inadequate rate levels, rate discrimination, and
2. Although most of this narrowing trend has resulted from a few decisions of the Supreme
Court, see infra notes 77-99, 305-12 and accompanying text, many lower courts not only have
adopted this trend, but also are vying to limit the exemption even further.
3. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982).
5. The history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is discussed infra notes 24-50 and accompany-
ing text.
6. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
7. Until 1944 the Supreme Court did not consider insurance to be within the scope of the
commerce clause; federal regulation therefore would have been impossible. See infra notes 15, 24-50
and accompanying text.
8. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561 (1944) ("opin-
ions expressed by various persons that unrestricted competition in insurance results in financial
chaos and public injury").
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insolvency. 9 "Rate-setting in concert was the industry's answer to these pre-
sumed dangers." 10
Although the danger of insurer insolvency required that premium rates not
be too low, it also was important that insurance rates not be set at excessive
levels as a result of compacts between insurers. 1 These competing objectives-
keeping insurance companies solvent and preventing them from placing unnec-
essary restraints on competition-led many states to regulate insurance compa-
nies operating within their borders.12 Thus, a recent governmental report
concluded that "the interests of industry, consumers, and society in sharing risks
and spreading the cost of loss are so compelling that a government regulatory
system is justified." 13
This inherent tension between the desire by policyholders for both the bene-
fits of competition and some control of the activities of insurance companies is at
the heart of the theory supporting state regulation of the insurance business.
[T]he policyholder must be considered . . . . On the one hand, he
wants his company's financial structure to be strong, its reserves ade-
quate, its rating plans sound, its advertising truthful and its policy
forms understandable. To be assured of these things, his interest re-
quires that state supervision and regulation be effective. On the other
hand, he never ceases to hope for lower premium rates, broader policy
coverage, more efficient service and more aggressive management. The
objectives are attainable primarily through competiton. 14
9. J. DAY, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1970).
10. Id. A substantial part of the problem is that an insurer may have difficulty assessing the
risks involved and hence the magnitude of claims that it may have to pay. Thus, although premiums
define the insurer's income, its costs or expenses are far less predictable. If an insurer underestimates
the claims it will have to pay, it may not have sufficient funds to pay them. This uncertainty will
lead either to a lack of adequate coverage, insolvency of the company, or both. This uncertainty is
far more serious for property or liability insurers than for health or life insurers; in the latter catego-
ries actuarial tables, health statistics, and other predictors make the accurate assessment of risk far
easier. As a result, it is argued that state regulation of these latter insurers is far less necessary and
that they are far less deserving of antitrust immunity. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW
OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL (1979), reprinted in [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 897, at Special
Supp. 65 (Jan. 18, 1979).
11. J. DAY, supra note 9, at 18-19. The concern about excessive rates by agreement led a
number of states to enact anticompact statutes. See id. at 19.
12. In 1909 Kansas became the first state to enact legislation providing for joint ratemaking by
insurers, subject to regulatory approval. These regulatory statutes negated the effect of prior state
anticompact legislation. Id. at 19.
13. U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., ISSUES AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE REGULATION
OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 11 (1979). State regulation often be-
comes the necessary substitute for consumer knowledge, which is generally lacking in the insurance
field. Id. at 11-12.
14. Bergson, Regulation v. Competition, 1956 INS. L.J. 703, 705.
More recently, another justification for state regulation has been profferred-to prevent rates or
rate classifications that are discriminatory or unaffordable by potential insureds. It is argued that
absent regulation, insurers either would decline to insure certain persons when the perceived risk
exceeds the premium that could be charged, or would place certain persons in high risk groups when
these persons either have no control over these high risk characterizations or simply cannot afford
the high premiums. "Social policy" therefore requires state regulation, which effectively will subsi-
dize these persons and guarantee that insurance coverage will be available to them. See NAT'L
COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at Special
Supp. 71.
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During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the regulation of in-
surance companies took place exclusively at the state level. Indeed, the prevail-
ing view was that the federal government lacked the power to regulate or control
the insurance business.15 Although there was unevenness in the level and qual-
ity of regulation by the forty-eight states, state supervision generally contributed
both to enhanced protection of policyholders and increased stability among in-
surance companies. 16 In addition, the regulation of insurance often was accom-
panied by taxation of these companies; in many states this was an important
source of revenue.
In 1944 the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association,17 a landmark decision that threatened to dis-
place substantially this state regulation and taxation regime. The Court held
that insurance was commerce for purposes of the commerce clause and thus was
subject to the federal antitrust laws. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was in large
part a congressional attempt to overturn the effect that South-Eastern Under-
writers had on the states' ability to regulate the insurance business.",
The primary concern of the sponsors of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was
that full application of federal laws-especially the antitrust laws-to the insur-
ance industry would preclude state regulation of insurance companies that was
intended to protect policyholders, would interfere with continued state taxation
of all insurance company activities, and would prevent some of the more neces-
sary functions of insurance groups such as cooperative ratemaking.t 9 Although
it promotes these goals, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not exempt insurance
companies completely from federal laws. The exemption exists only when three
requirements are satisfied. 20 The intention of the Congress in passing the Act
was to restore to the states the opportunity to regulate and tax insurance within
15. Prior to the decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944), the Court had held that insurance was not "commerce" for purposes of the commerce clause.
See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); Hooper v. California, 155
U.S. 648 (1895); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). Congress tacitly had affirmed the
sole regulation of insurance by the states by failing to enact several bills providing for federal regula-
tion of the insurance business. See 90 CONG. REc. A4404 (1944).
16. For a good discussion of the history of state regulation of insurance and its relation to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation:
The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 545 (1958). The fire insur-
ance industry is illustrative of the instability that prevailed prior to state regulation. As early as 1877
it was noted that although approximately 4000 insurers had been in the business at one time or
another, only 1000 remained. Id. at 547-48.
17. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). South-Eastern Underwriters is described infra notes 31-39 and accom-
panying text.
18. In his treatise on economic regulation of insurance, Day noted: "Congress opted for state
primacy because of the possible dislocation and confusion that might result from the disruption of
established regulatory and operating practices and its belief that the states possessed the experience
in insurance regulation necessary to regulate 'local' industry problems." J. DAY, supra note 9, at 24-
25.
19. Although this latter function was deemed essential for the protection of policyholders from
both excessive premiums and inadequate coverage, absent exemptive legislation such cooperative
ratemaking among insurers clearly would have violated the federal antitrust laws.
20. The activities of insurance'companies are exempted only to the extent that they constitute
the "business of insurance," are regulated by state law, and do not constitute an agreement to or act
of boycott, coercion, or intimidation. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(b), 1013(b) (1982).
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their respective boundaries, while applying the antitrust laws to conduct not
necessary for the welfare of the policyholder.2 '
Despite these rationales for substantial antitrust immunity for certain insur-
ance activities, there have been numerous recent calls for substantial modifica-
tion or repeal of the exemption.22 As a corollary to the prevailing national
mood for deregulation of many industries, many now believe that the insurance
industry should be subject to the same rules of substantial competition-which
the antitrust laws promote-that apply to most other industries. The Supreme
Court's recent interpretations of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 2 3 are consistent
with these trends; the successful assertion of the defense for insurance company
activities has become substantially more difficult since 1978.
II. SOURCE OF THE EXEMPTION-THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT AND
ITS HISTORY2 4
Prior to 1944 regulation of the insurance industry was undertaken solely by
the states. In 1869 the Supreme Court held in Paul v. Virginia 25 that a state
statute regulating a "foreign" insurance company did not violate the commerce
clause of the Constitution. Justice Field's opinion concluded that "[i]ssuing a
policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce" 26 and that insurance con-
tracts "are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the word."'27 The
Supreme Court later broadened the Paul decision, holding that the "business of
insurance" generally was not commerce. 28
In the period between 1869 and 1944 many bills designed to give the federal
21. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946) ("Obviously Congress' pur-
pose was broadly to give support to the existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing
the business of insurance.").
22. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES,
supra note 10, at Special Supp. 64-73; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON
ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES 30 (1977); S. 1710, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ("Federal Insurance Act of
1977" (proposal to modify exemption)); H.R. 7623, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (proposal to repeal
exemption); Continuation of Business of Insurance Exemption is Scrutinized by Rodino Panel, 46
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 761, at 768 (Apr. 19, 1984).
23. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
24. See J. DAY, supra note 9; Kimball & Boyce, supra note 16; Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson
Act's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587; Wiley,
Pups, Plants and Package Policies-or the Insurance Antitrust Exemption Reexamined, 6 VILL. L.
REV. 281, 286-91 (1961); Note, A Year ofS.E.U.A., 23 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 317 (1945).
25. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). Paul was an agent for insurance companies incorporated in
the state of New York. A Virginia statute required anyone wishing to sell insurance policies in the
state to deposit bonds with the state treasurer. Although Paul satisfied a number of other require-
ments imposed by the statute, he failed to deposit the required bonds. After he began soliciting
insurance policies, he was convicted and fined by a Virginia circuit court; the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. In his unsuccessful appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, Paul argued that Virginia had no power to regulate his conduct because the commerce clause
conferred that authority to Congress.
26. Id. at 183.
27. Id.
28. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); Hooper v. Califor-
nia, 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
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government express power to regulate insurance were introduced in Congress. 29
None of these bills was passed. 30 Thus, until the Supreme Court's 1944 decision
in South-Eastern Underwriters,31 both the courts and Congress approved of ex-
clusive regulation of the business of insurance by the states.3 2
In South-Eastern Underwriters the United States alleged that South-Eastern
Underwriters Association (SEUA), an insurance association, violated sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act33 by fixing rates and using other illegal measures to
coerce people into purchasing insurance policies from its member companies.
Overruling over seventy-five years ofjudicial precedent, the Supreme Court held
that insurance was commerce for purposes of the commerce clause and therefore
that the business of insurance was subject to federal laws.34 The Court con-
cluded that insurance should be treated no differently than any other business
that affects interstate commerce: "No commercial enterprise of any kind which
conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the
regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an
exception of the business of insurance."'3 5
Chief Justice Stone's and Justice Jackson's dissenting opinions3 6 expressed
many of the fears and concerns of insurers, state insurance commissioners, and
Congress about how and by whom the insurance industry would be regulated.37
Because no federal legislation dealt with insurance, they objected that insurance
29. See generally 90 CONG. REC. A4404 (1944) (discussing the bills).
30. Id.
31. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
32. Even while the appeal in South-Eastern Underwriters was pending before the Court, several
abortive efforts were made to immunize the business of insurance from the federal antitrust laws.
FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1960).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982).
34. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 552-53. Justice Black's opinion asserted that prior
decisions had involved only whether the states could regulate insurance and had not reached the
issue raised in South-Eastern Underwriters-whether the reach offederal legislation was limited such
that a federal statute like the Sherman Act could not regulate the business of insurance. Thus, in
concluding that insurance was commerce for the purposes of the Sherman Act, the Court was not
overruling prior cases, but only was rejecting the implications of their broad language regarding
insurance and the commerce clause. The practical result of the extension of federal law to insurance,
however, was to displace inconsistent state law and regulation and to make unlawful certain conduct
by insurance companies that previously had been either condoned or affirmatively approved by the
states.
On the other hand, the decision would not necessarily have prevented continued, albeit more
limited, state regulation of insurance company conduct, and also would not preclude state licensing
and taxation. See id. at 548-49. Nevertheless, because there was concern in Congress and elsewhere
that the Court's decision might affect even this latter form of state control, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act was drafted broadly.
35. Id. at 553. The Court also rejected the argument that the Congress in 1890 did not intend
to bring insurance companies within the scope of the Sherman Act. The Court held that the Sher-
man Act was intended to be constitutionally broad in its language and scope and that exemptions for
specific industries had to be the product of express language or stated intent. Id. at 552-62,
36. Id. at 562 (Stone, C.J., dissenting), 584 (Jackson, J., dissenting in part). Justice Frankfurter
joined in the opinion of the Chief Justice. Two members of the Court did not participate in the
decision.
37. South-Eastern Underwriters was a four-to-three decision. It has been argued that in so
proceeding, the Court went against an informal rule of not deciding constitutional questions with
less than a five-Justice majority. See Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance
Rates, 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 669, 686-87 (1967); cf Mayor of New York v. Miln, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 85
(1835) (Court refused to consider case involving constitutional questions when vacancy existed.)
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companies would suffer a serious lack of direction after the decision. 38 They
argued that this abrupt change in federal policy towards insurance regulation
would leave the insurance industry, the policyholders, the states, and the federal
government in a state of confusion. 39
In the wake of South-Eastern Underwriters, Congress moved quickly to en-
act legislation that would allow the states to regulate those activities in the insur-
ance industry that otherwise would be subject to federal regulations such as the
antitrust laws. In a step that would have reversed the South-Eastern Underwrit-
ers decision altogether, the House of Representatives, less than three weeks after
the decision, passed a bill that would have provided the insurance industry with
a total exemption from the federal antitrust laws. 4° Known in the House as the
Walter-Hancock Bill, this legislation also was passed, but later rejected on re-
consideration, by the Senate.4
1
After Congress failed to enact this complete exemption legislation, different
groups offered suggestions to allow state regulation without precluding the ap-
plication of federal laws to insurance. The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners presented a proposal that provided for a partial exemption from
federal laws, giving the states primary regulatory power over the business of
insurance.42 This proposal was modified and then introduced as the McCarran-
Ferguson Bill.4 3 After the House and Senate passed different versions of the
Bill, it was sent to a conference committee and amended substantially.
The amended Bill provided for a three-year complete exemption for the
insurance industry from all federal laws; this exemption was designed to allow
the states to adjust their regulatory schemes to accommodate federal law. 44 Af-
38. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 582-83 (Stone, C.J., dissenting), 590-93 (Jackson,
J., dissenting in part).
39. Id.
40. H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). The bill passed in the House by a vote of 283 to 54.
90 CONG. REC. 6565 (1944).
Concern over the then-pending South-Eastern Underwriters case led to the introduction of this
legislation in the House and a companion bill in the Senate, see infra note 41, in 1943 after the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia had rejected the government's
antitrust challenge, but before the Supreme Court's eventual decision reversing that disposition. The
passage of the total exemption bill in the House only 17 days after the Court's decision reflects this
pent-up concern.
41. S. 1362, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). On September 21, 1944, the Senate passed its version
of the Bill, known as the Bailey-Van Nuys Bill; it rejected the Bill later the same day after a motion
for reconsideration. For the Senate discussion of the motion for reconsideration, see 90 CONG. REc.
8054 (1944). Several reasons were given for the Senate's eventual rejection of the complete exemp-
tion Bill. The three most important were the following: the threat by President Franklin Roosevelt
to veto the Bill; the limited support it received from the insurance industry generally (although
certain stock companies and casualty insurers preferred this approach, life insurers and mutual com-
panies were unsupportive); and the preference of state insurance commissioners-represented by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners-for a limited exemption. See generally Rose,
supra note 37, at 682-704 (discussing limited support of insurance industry); Weller, supra note 24,
at 592 & n.34 (discussing the veto threat); Note, supra note 24, at 321-25 (discussing the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners desire for a limited exemption).
42. 90 CONG. REC. A4406 (1944).
43. S. 340, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REc. 330 (1945).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(a) (1982).
1985]
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ter the three-year moratorium expired, federal law4 5 would be displaced to the
extent that the states actually regulated the particular form of the "business of
insurance" under scrutiny. The amended form of the Bill also provided that
agreements to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, as well as acts of boycott, coercion,
or intimidation, were not exempt from federal laws.46 The House passed the Bill
without debate,4 7 while the Senate passed it after two days of consideration. 48
President Roosevelt then signed the Bill on March 9, 1945.49 The Act as cur-
rently in force provides:
§ 1 Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by
the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest,
and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to
impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the
several States.
§ 2 (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the
regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax on such busi-
ness, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance:
Provided, That after June 30, 1948, . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the
Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent
that such business is not regulated by State law.
§ 3 (a) Until June 30, 1948, . . . the Sherman Act, .... the Clayton
Act,. . . the Federal Trade Commission Act, and . . . the Robinson-
Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of
insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sher-
man Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimi-
45. See Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F.2d 527, 531-33 (7th Cir. 1974) (§ 2(b)
exception also applies to Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982)).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1982).
47. 91 CONG. REC. 1396 (1945).
48. S. 340, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); 91 CONG. REC. 1442-44, 1477-89 (1945).
The Supreme Court's treatment of this legislative history has been inconsistent, confusing, and
occasionally inaccurate. Most notably, in SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458 (1969), the
Court stated that "[e]ven before the [South-Eastern Underwriters] opinion was announced, the
House had passed a bill exempting the insurance industry from the antitrust laws." As noted supra
note 40 and accompanying text, however, the Supreme Court's decision was announced on June 5,
1944, and the House did not pass H.R. 3270, the Walter-Hancock Bill, until June 22, 1944. In St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 561 n.l 1 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting), Justice
Stewart, in discussing the passage of H.R. 3270 in June 1944, incorrectly cited to 90 CoNc. RFc.
6510; in fact, that reference is to the House's passage of H.R. Res. 422, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944),
which was only a resolution to consider H.R. 3270. In FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293,
299 n.5 (1960), the Court noted that there had been abortive attempts to immunize the insurance
industry from the antitrust laws; for this proposition, however, it cited to the Congressional Record
pages describing the introduction of these bills, rather than to the pages describing when the bills
were considered and defeated.
49. 91 CONG. REC. 1992 (1945). The background and legislative history of the Act are re-
counted in the first Supreme Court decision after the statute's passage. See Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 414-17, 428-33 (1946).
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date, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.50
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION
Congress did not intend the McCarran-Ferguson Act to provide a whole-
sale exemption from federal laws for the insurance business.5 1 Rather, it estab-
lished three requirements that must be satisfied before the activities of insurance
companies will be exempted from the application of federal law.
The first two requirements are found in section 2(b) of the Act. First, the
conduct complained of must be within the "business of insurance."'5 2 This re-
quirement goes to the heart of the Act, for the term "business of insurance"
identifies the narrow range of activities that Congress sought to exempt from
federal laws. This requirement has been the subject of the majority of judicial
decisions under the Act. Second, the challenged conduct must be "regulated by
State law."'5 3 Since the Act essentially was intended to restore the regulation of
insurance to the pre-South-Eastern Underwriters situation in which the states
had exclusive responsibility for that regulation, it was not intended to leave in-
surance company activities free of federal control if the states did not fill the
breach. In contrast to the narrow interpretation given to "the business of insur-
ance," the courts have interpreted this second requirement broadly.5 4
The third requirement is articulated in section 3 of the Act. Even if the
activity is within the "business of insurance" and is regulated by state law, it will
not be immunized if it constitutes an agreement to or an act of boycott, coercion,
or intimidation. 55
A. Activity Must Encompass "Business of Insurance"
Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance . . . : Provided, That after June 30, 1948, ...
the Sherman Act, . . . the Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade
Commission Act, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the
extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
56
Although Congress affirmatively provided that the states could regulate the
"business of insurance" and further provided that state law designed to achieve
50. Act of Mar. 9, 1945, ch. 20, §§ 1-3, 59 Stat. 33-34 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1013 (1982)).
51. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (bill that would have provided a total exemp-
tion from federal antitrust laws for the business of insurance not enacted).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982).
53. Id. It bears emphasis that although the business-of-insurance requirement and the regu-
lated-by-State-law requirement are both found in § 2(b), they are separate and must be satisfied
independently. Thus, as the Supreme Court has stressed, the mere fact that aspects, of insurance
companies are regulated by state law does not mean that these aspects constitute the "business of
insurance." See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 230 n.38 (1979).
54. See infra notes 254-99 and accompanying text.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1982).
56. Id. § 1012(b) (emphasis added).
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that purpose would not be invalidated by federal law, the Act contains no defini-
tion of the term "business of insurance." The determination of this question,
which has given rise to the majority of decisions under the Act, has arisen in the
following five types of relationships: agreements between an insurer and a third
party that is not a member of the insurance industry; agreements between insur-
ance companies; relations between the insurer and its policyholders; relation-
ships between an insurance company and its agents or others in the insurance
industry; and unilateral activities by insurance companies. 5 7
In two recent decisions the Supreme Court articulated the test to determine
whether the alleged unlawful conduct constitutes the "business of insurance."5 8
A court must consider the conduct in light of three factors: whether, with re-
spect to the challenged activity, the insurance company is engaging in an under-
writing or risk-spreading function; whether the conduct involves the relationship
between the insurer and the policyholder; and whether the conduct is limited to
activities between entities within the insurance industry. This tripartite test will
be applied in all determinations whether the activity in question constitutes the
"business of insurance."
The first step in determining whether a particular activity constitutes the
"business of insurance" is determining the applicable law-that of the federal
courts or a state. In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company of
America 59 the Securities and Exchange Commission sought to enjoin a life in-
surance company from offering certain kinds of variable annuity contracts with-
out first registering them under the Securities Act of 193360 and the Investment
Company Act of 1940.61 Because the laws of a number of states and the District
of Columbia did regulate to some extent both defendant generally and its issu-
ance of these contracts specifically, defendant argued that section 2(b) of the Act
rendered these federal laws inapplicable to these activities. 62
At issue in Variable Annuity Life, which arose in a non-antitrust context,
was whether these offerings constituted the "business of insurance" for purposes
of section 2(b) of the Act. The Court began by emphasizing that this determina-
tion was a federal question and was not governed by statements of state legisla-
tures or state courts.
63
The Supreme Court then held, on the merits, that these annuities were not
insurance contracts, that their issuance by defendant did not constitute the
"business of insurance," and that therefore the McCarran-Ferguson exemption
57. See infra notes 100-253 and accompanying text.
58. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Group Life & Health Ins, Co,
v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
59. 359 U.S. 65 (1959). This case was decided by a five-to-four vote.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982).
61. Id. § 80a-1.
62. Defendant also argued that provisions of the two statutes-the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Investment Company Act of 1940-exempted insurance companies and insurance contracts.
The Court held that whether defendant fell within these two statutes involved a "question common
...to § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. . . [i.e.,] whether respondents are issuing contracts
of insurance." Variable Annuity Life, 359 U.S. at 67-68.
63. Id. at 69.
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did not apply.64 The Court emphasized that insurance involved some element of
risk-spreading; the underwriting of risks is "the one earmark of insurance as it
has commonly been conceived of in popular understanding and usage."' 65 This
requirement of risk-spreading, which was the only factor to which the Court in
Variable Annuity Life looked, has become one element of a three-part test for
those activities that are shielded by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
66
The next consideration by the Supreme Court of the "business of insur-
ance," SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,67 once again was in a nonantitrust con-
text involving an alleged securities violation. One insurance company acquired
the stock of another insurance company; the acquisition was approved by the
Arizona Director of Insurance, who had examined the transaction and deter-
mined that it satisfied the requirements of the Arizona insurance statutes. The
SEC challenged the acquisition in federal court, asserting that the nondisclosure
by the acquiring company of certain material facts to the stockholders of the
acquired company violated the Secutities Exchange Act of 1934.68 Both the
trial court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
the SEC's challenge shielded by section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
dismissed the complaint.
The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that "[t]he first question posed
by this case is whether the relevant Arizona statute is a 'law enacted. . . for the
purposes of regulating the business of insurance' within the meaning of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act."'69 The Court then concluded that "it is clear where the
focus [of the exemption] was-it was on the relationship between the insurance
company and the policyholder."' 70  I
The Court stressed that the exemption was not for "all the activities of
insurance companies; [the statutory] language refers not to the persons or com-
64. Id. at 71-73. The principal analysis in Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court, and even
more so in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion and Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion (for himself
and three other members of the Court), was on the application of the securities laws to this conduct,
and on the intent of Congress in 1933 and 1940 rather than in 1945. See supra note 62. In a
subsequent decision, SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967), the Court held that a
deferred annuity contract offered by an insurance company also was subject to the registration re-
quirements of the Securities Act of 1933; the Court did not address the possibility of a McCarran-
Ferguson exemption.
65. Variable Annuity Life, 359 U.S. at 73. The Court had stated that "the concept of 'insur-
ance' involves some investment risk-taking on the part of the company." Id. at 71.
66. In a decision the year before, FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958), the Court
had held that the preparation and shipment of allegedly unfair advertising by insurance companies
fell within the § 2(b) exemption. The Court apparently assumed that the business-of-insurance re-
quirement was satisfied; it did not consider explicitly whether this conduct constituted the business
of insurance. This advertising, however, clearly did not relate directly to the underwriting-of-risk
function. Cf. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 244 (1979) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (finding National Casualty indistinguishable). National Casualty is discussed infra
notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
67. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
69. National See., 393 U.S. at 457.
70. Id. at 460. The Court expressed the primacy of this standard in a number of ways. See
e.g., id. at 459 ("The McCarran-Ferguson Act was an attempt ... to assure that the activities of
insurance companies in dealing with their policyholders would remain subject to state regulation.");
infra text accompanying note 76.
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panies who are subject to state regulation, but to laws 'regulating the business of
insurance.' "71 The opinion then provided examples of conduct that were within
the scope of this limitation: "Certainly the fixing of rates is part of this business
.... "72 "The selling and advertising of policies,[ 73] . . .and the licensing of
companies and their agents[74 are also within the scope of the statute. ' 75 Fi-
nally, the Court generalized about the forms of conduct that were within the
exemption: "Congress was concerned with the type of state regulation that cen-
ters around the contract of insurance . . . . The relationship between insurer
and insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpreta-
tion, and enforcement-these were the core of the 'business of insurance.' "76
In National Securities the Court seemed to be substituting a new analysis
for that used in Variable Life Annuity rather than adding an additional criterion.
Subsequent cases, however, demonstrate that this requirement-that the activi-
ties of the insurance company under scrutiny must be between it and its policy-
holders, rather than with investors or others-has become the second prong of
the business-of-insurance test. The third prong of the test, as well as a fuller
development of the first two factors, evolved in the next two Supreme Court
decisions involving this issue.
The two most recent cases to have considered the "business of insurance,"
Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co. 77 and Union Labor Life
Insurance Co. v. Pireno,78 have expanded the factors to be weighed from two to
three.79 It is noteworthy, however, that the Court seems not to treat these crite-
ria as part of a checklist, each of which must be satisfied before the conduct in
question is deemed within the "business of insurance." Rather, they are merely
factors to be considered and balanced in making an overall judgment on the
nature of the scrutinized activity.
In Royal Drug the Texas Blue Shield corporation, a company engaged in
71. National Sec., 393 U.S. at 459.
72. Id. at 460 ("Mhat is what South-Eastern Underwriters was all about.").
73. Id. (citing FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958)).
74. Id. (citing Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
78. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
79. The Supreme Court also gave brief consideration to the "business of insurance" in a recent
non-antitrust decision, Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3500 n.17 (1983)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part). Plaintiff in Norris challenged under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 the use by the State of Arizona of deferred compensation plans that paid different bene-
fits to male and female employees. Speaking for himself and four other members of the Court,
Justice Marshall asserted that the plan was not exempt from challenge because of the McCarran.
Ferguson Act since "the plaintiffs. . . have not challenged the conduct of the business of insurance.
All that is at issue in this case is an employment practice: the practice of offering a male employee
the opportunity to obtain greater monthly annuity benefits than could be obtained by a similarly
situated female employee." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part). Justice Powell, dissenting in part
in an opinion for himself and three other Justices, concluded that both the McCarran-Ferguson Act
and the legislative intent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act evinced a willingness to allow state regulation
of such insurance compensation determinations. Id. at 3506-08 (Powell, J., dissenting in part). The
same issues had been raised and similarly resolved in an earlier circuit court case, Spirt v. Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063-66 (2d Cir. 1982).
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offering health care insurance, had entered into "provider agreements" with
pharmacies with the intent of reducing the cost of reimbursement for prescrip-
tion drugs.80 Each pharmacy in Texas was offered the opportunity to contract
with Blue Shield to become a "participating pharmacy." Each such store agreed
to furnish pharmaceuticals to insureds of Blue Shield on a "cost plus fixed mark-
up" basis; Blue Shield would make direct payment of the pharmacy's costs to
the pharmacy and the insured would pay the pharmacy the two dollar "mark-
up" amount. With respect to drugs purchased from nonparticipating pharma-
cies, however, the insured paid the entire prescription price; Blue Shield then
reimbursed him only seventy-five percent of the difference between the prescrip-
tion price and two dollars. 81 The result of this program was to encourage in-
sureds to patronize participating pharmacies. Several nonparticipating
pharmacies challenged Blue Shield's practice as a price-fixing agreement in vio-
lation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Although the district court dismissed
the complaint, concluding that the agreements between Blue Shield and the par-
ticipating pharmacies were immunized by section 2(b) of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The
court of appeals concluded that these challenged agreements were not part of the
"business of insurance." 82
In affirming the court of appeals, 83 the Supreme Court identified three fac-
tors that were to be weighed in making this determination. 84 First, the Court
noted that "[t]he primary elements of an insurance contract are the spreading
and underwriting of a policyholder's risk." 85 Second, "[a]nother commonly un-
derstood aspect of the business of insurance relates to the contract between the
insurer and the insured."' 86 Evaluating the facts, the Court concluded that
80. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 214-16. "Provider agreements" are described infra text accompa-
nying note 101.
81. Id. at 209.
82. 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'g 415 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tex. 1976), aff'd, 440 U.S. 205
(1979).
83. The Court emphasized that the scope of the exemption is limited: "The exemption is for
the 'business of insurance,' not the 'business of insurers.'" Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 211.
Royal Drug was a five-to-four decision. One obvious area of disagreement concerned the gen-
eral scope of the exemption. Compare id. at 231 ("It is well settled that exemptions from the anti-
trust laws are to be narrowly construed .... ) with id. at 234-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
legislative history ... indicate[s] that Congress deliberately chose to phrase the exemption
broadly."). It also is implicit in the dissent that the scope of the "business of insurance" includes
some aspects of the "business of insurance companies." "[E]vidence of what states might reasonably
have considered to be and regulated as insurance at the time the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed
in 1945 is clearly relevant to [the] decision." Id. at 237-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. The Court only decided that the McCarran-Ferguson exemption did not apply; the decision
did not purport to pass on the merits of plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims. Id. at 210 & n.5 ("Whether
the Agreements are illegal under the antitrust laws is an entirely separate question .... It is
axiomatic that conduct which is not exempt from the antitrust laws may nevertheless be perfectly
legal."). The merits of this open issue-whether such provider agreements are unlawful-were con-
sidered in Medical Arts Pharmacy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 518 F. Supp. 1100, 1107-09 (D.
Conn. 1981) (per se rule inapplicable; rule of reason approach precludes disposition by summary
judgment). See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
85. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 211; see also id. at 213 ("[T]he underwriting or spreading of risk is
a critical determinant in identifying insurance.").
86. Id. at 215.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
neither of these criteria was met.87
In addition, the Court identified another consideration which suggested
that the agreements under attack were not part of the "business of insurance."
After reviewing the legislative history of McCarran-Ferguson, the Court con-
cluded that the Act's purpose was to allow insurance companies to continue to
work cooperatively, particularly in the area of rate-setting, under the supervision
of state authorities and thereby engage in joint activities that otherwise would be
unlawful under the Sherman Act. It was not contemplated, however, that the
exemption would extend to activities or agreements between an insurance com-
pany and a third party. In Royal Drug, the conduct was held not exempted by
McCarran-Ferguson "because the Pharmacy Agreements involve parties wholly
outside the insurance industry."'88
Although this third consideration was not identified clearly in Royal Drug
as an important concern, the Pireno court was far more explicit. In Pireno an
insurance company provided in its health insurance policies that its liability
would extend to the "reasonable charges" for "necessary medical care and serv-
ices." 89 To assist in evaluating the reasonableness of charges or the necessity of
medical services for which claims had been submitted by its insureds, the com-
pany arranged with health providers to organize a "peer review committee" that
would study these claims and report on their validity.90 Plaintiff was a chiro-
practor, some of whose charges to his patients had been rejected by the company
because of adverse reports from the peer review committee. He brought an ac-
tion under section 1 of the Sherman Act asserting that the arrangements be-
tween the company and the members of the committee constituted price fixing
agreements and a group boycott. As in Royal Drug, the district court dismissed
the claim, finding defendant company's activities shielded by section 2(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.91 This determination was rejected by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit92 and the Supreme Court,93
which both concluded that these arrangements were not part of the "business of
insurance."
In Pireno the Supreme Court summarized the factors relevant to this
determination:
[T]hree criteria [are] relevant in determining whether a particular
practice is part of the "business of insurance" exempted from the anti-
trust laws by § 2(b): first, whether the practice has the effect of trans-
ferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice
is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
87. The Court's discussion of the application of these two factors to the facts is described in
detail infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
88. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 231.
89. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 122.
90. Id. at 123.
91. Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) q 62,758
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 650 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
92. Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 458
U.S. 119 (1982).
93. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129.
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the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within
the insurance industry.
94
The Court's opinion elaborates on the significance of this third factor. The
congressional intent in passing McCarran-Ferguson was to protect intra-indus-
try cooperation and to sanction the diminution of competition within the insur-
ance industry, in part because its activities would be regulated by the states. On
the other hand, conduct by insurers that involves third parties may substantially
lessen competition outside the insurance industry. "Arrangements between in-
surance companies and parties outside the insurance industry can hardly be said
to lie at the center of [the] legislative concern." 95
The Court's treatment of these three criteria was a rejection of the "check-
list" approach. Indeed, the Court stressed that "[n]one of these criteria is neces-
sarily determinative in itself." 96 On the other hand, none of these factors may
be ignored or depreciated; a failure to satisfy any of the three will create substan-
tial difficulty for a defendant attempting to bring its conduct within the "busi-
ness of insurance."
97
It is obvious that the establishment of this three-part test was the Court's
vehicle for construing exemptions from the antitrust laws in a limited fashion.98
The Court, however, effectuated this result by opting for a mechanical rather
than an analytic approach. If the ultimate inquiry should be which activities of
insurance companies require cooperative effort, thereby justifying the substitu-
tion of governmental supervision and regulation for the full scrutiny of the anti-
trust laws, then the distinctions the Court made-for example, permitting joint
conduct that spreads the risk, but denying the exemption for risk reduction-
often will fail to reflect accurately the purpose of the statutory exemption. It
therefore is suggested that after further development of this tripartite test in the
lower courts, the Supreme Court should reexamine whether its application of
this test has been consistent with the goals of McCarran-Ferguson. Although
the Court has identified these criteria, applying them to particular factual situa-
tions has not proven easy.9
9
94. Id.
95. Id. at 133.
96. Id. at 129. The Court in Royal Drug had implied that these criteria might be accorded
different weights. Royal Drug had referred to "underwriting or spreading of risk as an indispensable
characteristic of insurance," Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 212, while merely stating that "[a]nother com-
monly understood aspect of the business of insurance relates to the contract between the insurer and
the insured." Id. at 215.
97. "We may assume that the challenged peer review practices need not be denied the § 2(b)
exemption solely because they involve parties outside the insurance industry. But the involvement of
such parties, even if not dispositive, constitutes part of the inquiry .... Thus we can not join
petitioners in depreciating [this] fact ...." Pireno, 458 U.S. at 133-34.
98. "It is well settled that exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed.
This doctrine is not limited to implicit exemptions from the antitrust laws, but applies with equal
force to express statutory exemptions." Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 231.
99. One open issue relates not to the specific activities of the insurance company, but to the type
of insurance being sold: whether the issuance of title insurance is part of the "business of insurance."
The question arises because it has been suggested that title insurance actually involves very little
underwriting of risk; such insurance usually is obtained for, and its premiums are calculated based
upon, the cost of escrow services and of the title search rather than the risk that a purchaser will
obtain inadequate title to real property. Although some courts have acknowledged this fact, none-
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1. Relationships with Entities Outside the Insurance Industry
As noted, the two most recent Supreme Court decisions that discussed the
"business of insurance"'1 have added a third factor to the analysis-whether
the challenged conduct involves an agreement between the insurance company
and an entity outside the industry. In both cases, after concluding that the chal-
lenged conduct was between an insurance company and a noninsurance entity,
the Court concluded that the McCarran-Ferguson exemption was unavailable.
These outside relationships also have been the subject of much of the business-
of-insurance jurisprudence in the lower courts. Two kinds of insurer-outsider
activity have been considered in detail: provider agreements and fee review
committees.
The greatest number of cases involving the definition of the "business of
insurance" have involved provider agreements. A provider agreement is a con-
tract or arrangement in which a third party agrees to provide certain goods or
services to the insurer's policyholders with direct payment made to the provider
from the insurer. The insurer usually can decrease its costs through such ar-
rangements because it can bargain for lower rates than would be afforded by the
provider to a policyholder. Such provider arrangements have been used princi-
pally in the fields of health and automobile insurance. Generally, the same stan-
dard for determining whether the arrangements are within the "business of
insurance" has been applied to all types of insurance.101
The seminal provider agreement case is Group Life & Health Insurance Co.
theless courts consistently hold--or assume-that title insurance is indeed within the "business of
insurance." See Lawyers Title Co. v. St. Paul Title Ins. Corp., 526 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1975); Craw-
ford v. American Title & Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1975); Commander Leasing Co. v. Trans-
america Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973); Escrow Disbursement Ins. Agency v.
American Title & Ins. Co., 550 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Lawyer's Realty Corp. v. Peninsular
Title Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 550 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1977); McIlhenny
v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land
Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Mitgang v. Western Title Ins. Co., 1974-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 75,322 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
In a recent case, United States v. Title Ins. Rating Bureau, 700 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984), however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that escrow services were not part of the "business of insurance" under the Royal Drug tripartite
test. The court also observed that the Supreme Court never has resolved the status of title insurance.
Id. at 1250. It remains to be seen whether these recent developments will have an effect on judicial
treatment of title insurance.
In First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (D.S.D.
1982), aff'd, 714 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709 (1984), the United States
District Court for the District of South Dakota held that although certain essential activities of title
insurers-including seeking enforcement of a state law requiring that title insurance policies be
countersigned by an abstractor-were part of the "business of insurance;" other related activities
were not. See infra note 174. On Jan. 7, 1985, the FTC announced the filing of an administrative
complaint against six national title insurance companies, alleging that they unlawfully fixed prices on
title search and examination services through participation in rating bureaus, in violation of § 5 of
the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). The complaint specifically asserted that these activities were
not part of the "business of insurance," and hence were not exempted by the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. In re Ticor Title Ins. Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,219 (1985).
100. See supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
101. But see Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting
difference between ascertaining premium rates for automobile insurance and for health insurance).
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v. Royal Drug Co. 1 0 2 Prior to that decision most lower court decisions had fo-
cused on the criterion identified by the Supreme Court in SEC v. National Secur-
ities, Inc. 103-whether the conduct principally involved the relationship between
the insurer and the policyholder. 104 These courts had concluded that the agree-
ments between the insurer and a third-party service provider so directly affected
the insurer-insured relationship that they constituted the "business of
insurance." 105
As noted above, in Royal Drug the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test
to determine whether alleged unlawful conduct was within the "business of in-
surance." 10 6 In the course of applying this test to the provider agreement under
scrutiny, the Court adopted a narrower view of the "business of insurance" than
had many of these prior lower court decisions. 107
The Court began its analysis by stressing that the "primary elements of an
insurance contract are the spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's
risk." 10 8 Applying this factor, the Court construed the function of "risk-spread-
ing" narrowly. This characteristic did apply to the Blue Shield policies them-
selves, "which insure against the risk that policyholders will be unable to pay for
prescription drugs during the period of coverage." 10 9 On the other hand, the
challenged provider agreements spread no risk, but rather served only to mini-
mize the insurer's costs and maximize its profits. Independent arrangements
102. 440 U.S. 205 (1979); see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
103. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
104. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
105. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'g 406 F.
Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated, 440 U.S. 942 (1979); General Glass Co. v. Globe Glass & Trim
Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,998, at 74,268 (N.D. Ill.) ("Simply because a non-insurance,
service company is involved in the claims settlement process does not preclude a conclusion that, as
a matter of law, the 'business of insurance' embraces arrangements between the insurance companies
and third-party, non-policyholders who provide auto glass replacement services."), aff'd on reconsid-
eration, 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) q 62,231 (N.D. Ill. 1978); St. Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital
Serv. Ass'n, 1978-1 Trade Cas. 61,868 (E.D. La. 1977), rev'd, 618 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2342 (1984); Manasen v. California Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal.
1976), rev'd, 638 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1979); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977); Ander-
son v. Medical Serv., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,884 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 304
(4th Cir. 1977); Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 431 F. Supp. 5, 9-10 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd per curiam,
557 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976); Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Mich. 1973); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 361 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 80,
83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); see also Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., 1976-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 61,128 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (in suit challenging provider agreements, McCarran-Fergu-
son Act shields only insurers, not providers); Pastor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 1976-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 60,783 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (same). But see Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39
(5th Cir. 1974) (use of intermediary between insurer and provider may result in activities outside of
"business of insurance"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975); Hill v. National Auto Glass Co., 293 F.
Supp. 295, 296 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (holding that the insurer's activities were not part of the "business
of insurance").
106. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
107. See generally Richards, Federal Antitrust Law and the Royal Drug Pharmacy Agreement:
Implications for Formulating National Health Policy, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 233 (1981) (discussing deci-
sions prior to Royal Drug); Note, Insurance Provider Agreements Subject to Antitrust Scrutiny, 17
Hous. L. REV. 643 (1980) (discussing Supreme Court's adoption of narrower view).
108. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 211.
109. Id. at 213.
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between the insurer and third parties, even if they might redound indirectly to
the benefit of the insureds because of lower premiums' 10 and may be necessary
to the successful operation of the insurance plan, I I still are not part of the risk-
spreading or underwriting aspect of the business of insurance.
The second characteristic of the "business of insurance" is a contractual
relationship between the insurer and the insured; this was the factor on which
the Court had focused in National Securities.t12 This requirement was not satis-
fied in Royal Drug because the challenged pharmacy agreements were not "be-
tween insurer and insured." Rather, "[t]hey [were] separate contractual
arrangements between Blue Shield and pharmacies engaged in the sale and dis-
tribution of goods and services other than insurance."' 13 The Court rejected the
argument that this criterion was satisfied by conduct which, by controlling costs,
would "affect the 'reliability, interpretation, and enforcement' of the insurance
contract and 'relate closely to their status as reliable insurers.' "114 Almost all of
Blue Shield's activities would satisfy this requirement. "Such a result[, how-
ever,] would be plainly contrary to the statutory language, which exempts the
'business of insurance' and not the 'business of insurance companies.' ",15 To
obtain the exemption afforded by section 2(b), the conduct must involve the in-
surer-insured relationship, rather than merely affect it.
The Court's third criterion for determining whether challenged conduct
was part of the "business of insurance"-whether the conduct was limited to
entities within the insurance industry' t4-was derived from an examination of
the legislative history and purposes of the Act. The principal purpose of McCar-
ran-Ferguson was to allow the states to regulate and tax insurance companies to
the extent they had done so before the South-Eastern Underwriters decision. The
secondary purpose-but the one of chief importance to the Royal Drug deci-
sion-was to give insurance companies a limited exemption from the antitrust
laws.117 This exemption, however, was intended to extend only to "practices
which involved intra-industry cooperatives or concerted activities."' 18
The Court concluded that joint ratemaking between insurance companies
was the principal activity that Congress intended to protect with the McCarran-
110. "[T]here is an important distinction between risk underwriting and risk reduction. By re-
ducing the total amount it must pay to policyholders, an insurer reduces its liability and therefore its
risk. But unless there is some element of spreading risk more widely, there is no underwriting of
risk." Id. at 214 n.12.
111. "It is true that some type of provider agreement is necessary for a service benefit plan to
exist. But it does not follow that because an agreement is necessary to provide insurance, it is also
the 'business of insurance.'" Id. at 213 n.9.
112. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
113. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 216.
114. Id. (quoting National Sec., 393 U.S. at 460).
115. Id. at 217.
116. Id. at 231. The Court compared the impermissible presence ofa noninsurance entity as the
other party to the pharmacy agreements with similar situations involving the agricultural coopera-
tive exemption and the labor exemption, in which the presence of an entity outside the protected
group also results in the loss of the antitrust exemption. Id.
117. Id. at 218 n.18.
118. Id. at 222.
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Ferguson exemption. Contractual relationships with entities outside the indus-
try are not unique to the insurance business; therefore, Congress saw no special
needs requiring an exemption from the antitrust laws. "There is not the slightest
suggestion in the legislative history that Congress in any way contemplated that
arrangements such as the Pharmacy Agreements in this case, which involve the
mass purchase of goods and services from entities outside the insurance indus-
try, are the 'business of insurance.' "119
Although the Royal Drug Court's narrow application of the "business of
insurance" to Blue Shield's provider agreements may reflect correctly the pre-
vailing view of that term when Congress passed the Act in 1945,120 the Court's
decision conflicts with some of the broader purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson
exemption. The Court rejected as irrelevant to the existence of the immunity the
arguments that these pharmacy agreements would have resulted in lower costs
to the insurer and hence to the insured and that they might have been necessary
for the successful operation of the full-reimbursement plan. In allowing contin-
ued regulation of such activities by the states, Congress in 1945 intended to fos-
ter the financial stability of insurance companies and the establishment of low
premium rates with reasonable levels of protection to insureds. The Court's de-
cision tends to freeze insurance arrangements at the levels of innovation and
services prevalent in 1945-when there was considerable doubt that these health
care arrangements constituted insurance at all. 121 Because Blue Shield's pro-
vider agreements were among the necessary, reasonable, and beneficial activities
of an insurance company, it would have been wiser to include them within the
"business of insurance."
On the other hand, the Court might have desired to resolve these arguments
of "necessity" or "consumer benefit" on the merits of the antitrust analysis,
rather than through the preliminary issue of insurance activity blanket immu-
nity. Although the "business of insurance" now must be construed narrowly,
the arguments about the desirability of these provider agreements still can be
considered at the next stage. Under the rule of reason analysis, a court would
make a full calculus of the adverse impact and the benefits to evaluate the net
result of these restraints on competition, as well as the possible existence of less
restrictive and less anticompetitive arrangements. It may well turn out that Blue
Shield's provider agreements are lawful and still can be implemented. 122
Most subsequent lower court decisions dealing with provider agreements
have followed the narrower approach of Royal Drug. The application of the
119. Id. at 224.
120. The dissenting opinion offered several persuasive arguments why provider agreements in
general, and the Blue Shield pharmacy agreements in particular, were intended by the 1945 Congress
to fall within the "business of insurance." Id. at 243-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 225-30.
122. See, e.g., Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984),
on remand from 440 U.S. 205 (1979) (on merits, program between insurer and providers did not
constitute illegal price fixing or group boycott), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3507 (Jan. 15, 1985);
Medical Arts Pharmacy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 518 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Conn. 1981) (per se rule
inapplicable; rule of reason approach precludes disposition of challenge to provider agreements by
summary judgment), aff'd, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982).
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narrow test is best illustrated by recent challenges to the practices of a number of
automobile insurance companies. Automobile insurance policies typically pro-
vide that the insured will be reimbursed for damage to her car for no more than
the "reasonable" cost of repair. In a further effort to reduce the amount paid in
claims, some automobile insurance companies have sought to make cost reduc-
tion arrangements with repair shops. In exchange for an agreement by the ga-
rage to charge no more than a stated maximum price for designated repairs, the
insurance companies agreed to recommend these providers to insureds who had
no preference on a repair shop or who asked for recommendations of shops that
would perform the work for no more than the predetermined reasonable cost.
Every court but one has held that these "provider agreements" are not part of
the "business of insurance."' 23 The focus of the analysis has been on two factors
identified in Royal Drug-the arrangements involve agreements between an in-
surance company and a party outside the industry 124 and the defendants' pur-
pose in making these agreements is not the spreading or underwriting of risk,
but rather the reduction of cost.12 5
Similar results have been reached in recent cases involving provider agree-
ments between insurance companies and health care providers. These cases
have restricted the McCarran-Ferguson immunity even more narrowly than
Royal Drug.126 It has been held that the "business of insurance" does not in-
clude the following: an agreement between Blue Cross and "contracting hospi-
tals" providing direct payment for services rendered to Blue Cross' insureds,
while placing a ceiling on the amount the hospitals can receive;' 27 an agreement
123. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 336-37 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982); Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1201-02
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Liberty Glass Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 607 F.2d
135, 136-38 (5th Cir. 1979); Custom Auto Body, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 1983-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,629 (D.R.I. 1983). But see Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1980-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,591 (D.D.C. 1980) (agreements lawful), rey'd on thispoint and aff'd on other
grounds, 675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982). See also General Glass Co, v.
Globe Glass & Trim Co., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,231 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (decided before Royal
Drug); General Glass Co. v. Globe Glass & Trim Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,998 (N.D. I1l.)
(same), aff'd on reconsideration, 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9 62,231 (N.D. I11. 1978); cf. Workman v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 520 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (such provider agreements
lawful on merits; "business of insurance" issue not reached).
124. See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 336-37 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982).
An agreement between an insurance company and a provider has been characterized as vertical(between supplier and customer), in contrast to an agreement among insurance companies, which is
characterized as horizontal (between competitors or parties operating at the same level in the indus-
try). "The Court in Royal Drug emphasized that the pharmacy agreements under consideration
were for the purchase of goods and services outside the insurance industry. The same is true of the
alleged vertical arrangements in this case." Id. at 336. On the other hand, most horizontal agree-
ments are deemed to be within the "business of insurance." See infra notes 170-92 and accompany-
ing text.
125. See, e.g., Custom Auto Body, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
T 65,629 (D.R.I. 1983).
126. See Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 483 (4th Cir.
1980), ("[A]t the time of the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, activities of programs like
Blue Shield were not considered to be insurance at all. . . . [Tihe exemption should be narrowly
applied to Blue Shield plans, especially where provider control is in issue."), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
916 (1981).
127. See St. Bernard Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 618 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
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between a health maintenance organization-an entity acting as both an insurer
and a provider of health care services-and drug companies on the cost of
pharmaceuticals, even though defendant organization distributed the drugs di-
rectly to its insureds; t 28 an insurer's policy of requiring that certain medical
services be obtained by its insureds exclusively from certain providers;129 an in-
surance company's policy not to pay the charges of certain kinds of health care
providers for services rendered to its insureds unless the services were billed
through physicians;130 agreements between the insurer and "participating physi-
cians" in which they agree to accept the "usual, customary, and reasonable" fees
prevailing in the area for their services to the insureds;' 3 1 and even agreements
between an insurer and participating physicians under which the physicians
agree to accept reduced, pro rata compensation for their services if the insurer's
funds should be depleted. 132
Royal Drug and these subsequent decisions make it risky13 3 for insurance
companies to make reasonable, but arguably anticompetitive, arrangements with
providers even if these arrangements benefit the insureds. Perhaps the McCar-
ran-Ferguson immunity still can be preserved if the outside providers are some-
what uncertain about the amount they will be reimbursed so that there is an
element of risk-taking or underwriting in the provider agreements. 134 Similarly,
104 S. Ct. 2342 (1984); see also Blue Cross v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,588 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (bylaw of health care insurer, preventing physicians providing care to its
insureds from also contracting with competitor health maintenance organization, not part of "busi-
ness of insurance").
128. See Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.
1981); cf. Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276,
1284-87 (9th Cir.) (agreement between health care provider-insurer and its patients-insureds that
prescription drug benefit could be used only at provider's pharmacy was "business of insurance"
because it was part of insurer-insured relationship and did not involve outside entitites), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 88 (1983).
129. See Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 689 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 103 S. Ct.
3115 (1983); see also National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 628 F.2d
1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 1980) (refusal by health care insurer to enter into provider agreement with new,
private hospital not part of "business of insurance"), aff'g 479 F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd
on other grounds, 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
130. See Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 689 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3115 (1983); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 484 (4th Cir.
1980) (Defendants' "decision regarding psychologists was not whether to underwrite the risk of
those disorders or even the need for psychotherapy; rather it was a question of who they would pay
for such services."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); see also Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F.
Supp. 564 (D. Minn. 1981) (contracts between insurer, insureds, and "participating dentists" provid-
ing for payment of greater amounts to latter than to "non-participating dentists" not "business of
insurance" even if provider agreements reflect the terms of the contracts with the insureds that
describe the payment differentials).
131. See Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1983); see infra notes 154-56 and
accompanying text.
132. See Kartell v. Blue Shield, 542 F. Supp. 782, 792-94 (D. Mass. 1984) (fact that physicians
share risk with insurer still does not satisfy first part of Royal Drug test even though provider agree-
ment may result in lower costs and lower premiums to insureds).
133. A finding that the conduct in question is not the "business of insurance" and therefore is
not within the McCarran-Ferguson exemption, of course, does not mean that antitrust liability ex-
ists. There also must be a determination on the merits that the action violates the Sherman or
Clayton Act. See supra notes 84, 122.
134. See St. Bernard Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 618 F.2d 1140, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2342 (1984).
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the agreements might be immunized if the arguably anticompetitive restraints
first are incorporated in the policy between insurer and insured and then merely
are reflected in the provider agreements. 135 Even with these variations, how-
ever, courts probably will continue to focus on the third factor identified in
Royal Drug-the existence of relationships with noninsurance industry enti-
ties-and make this factor a barrier to assertion of the McCarran-Ferguson
shield. 136 Such an interpretation will be additional proof that the Court may
have proceeded unwisely in Royal Drug by refusing to take account of the cost-
reducing, efficiency-enhancing characteristics of the pharmacy agreements in
characterizing such agreements as outside the "business of insurance."
The other principal activities between insurers and outsiders subject to
challenge as outside the "business of insurance" are various devices to review the
amounts and scope of claims made by insureds against the insurance companies.
Since many kinds of insurance policies contain provisions relating both the
range of insured-against incidents and the amount that will be paid to standards
prevailing in the relevant community, the insurance companies have felt a need
for input from others, including providers, on these standards. Yet, to the ex-
tent that such information can inhibit competition regarding the identity of
providers, the services they can offer under the insurance policies, and the
amount they can charge, antitrust concerns will be raised. If these means of
collecting information were deemed part of the "business of insurance," how-
ever, the McCarran-Ferguson Act would exempt these activities from antitrust
examination.
The Supreme Court's most recent McCarran-Ferguson decision, Union La-
135. See Mulhearn v. Rose-Neath Funeral Home, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1981)
(agreement between insurer and designated funeral homes allowing insured only a 75% alternative
cash payment provision when services of undesignated funeral homes were used was within "busi-
ness of insurance" when these provisions also were incorporated in insurance policies). But see
Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 216 n.14 ("The wholly separate nature of the two categories of agreements is
in no way affected by the fact that the Pharmacy Agreements are indirectly referred to in the insur-
ance policies."); Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 564 (D. Minn. 1981) (discussed supra
note 130).
136. Not only has this factor become controlling in the cases described supra notes 123-35 and
accompanying text; it also has been extended inappropriately. In United States v. Title Ins. Rating
Bureau Inc., 700 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984), the government
challenged price-fixing by title insurance companies in the offering of escrow services, Noting that
the challenged agreement was solely among defendant insurers, the court stated that their "activity
would seem at first glance to satisfy the third requirement." The court continued: "However, Con-
gress seems to have envisioned a total horizontal restraint." Id. at 1252. This still would seem to
have been satisfied by the fact that only parties engaged in the same activity--offering title insur-
ance-were charged with the antitrust violation. See supra note 124. The court, however, found
that the price-fixing still did not meet this requirement because there were other, noninsurance com-
panies that also performed escrow services, and the level of competition they could offer would be
distorted by this arrangement.
This interpretation seems to add new limitations to the business-of-insurance requirement. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suggests that conduct is such "business" only
when it is engaged in exclusively by insurance companies and only when the conduct does not affect
the ability of noninsurance companies to compete. These requirements will narrow the exemption
even further and take the Act further from the legislative intent of the Congress in 1945, which was
to return the power to control the activities of insurance companies to the states while removing that
conduct from the scrutiny of federal antitrust and other legislation.
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bor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno, 137 addressed the scope of the business-of-insur-
ance requirement in the context of one such information-gathering device, the
peer review committee.' 38 In its opinion, however, the Court considered this
requirement more expansively and in the process narrowed the availability of the
McCarran-Ferguson exemption. As noted above, 139 in Pireno defendant insur-
ance company had arranged with health care providers to organize a "peer re-
view committee" to study the claims submitted by its insureds and to assist the
company in determining whether these claims were within the coverage of the
company's policies. Plaintiff was a health care provider, some of whose patient
charges had been rejected by the insurance company because of adverse reports
from the peer review committee. Asserting that his ability to compete had been
impaired, he brought an action under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 140 Defend-
ant insurance company asserted that antitrust scrutiny of this conduct was fore-
closed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Rejecting this defense, the Supreme
Court concluded that the use of such peer review groups was not part of the
"business of insurance" and therefore the exemption was unavailable. 14 1
After describing its decision in Royal Drug, the Supreme Court summarized
the tripartite standard it had articulated. 142 Then, applying that standard to the
peer review committee, the Court concluded that none of the three criteria were
satisfied.
First, the Court concluded that the peer review committee did not perform
any risk-spreading or underwriting function. The transfer of risk takes place at
the time that the insurer and the insured enter into the contract, the insurance
policy.143 " 'Peer review takes place only after the risk had been transferred by
means of the policy. . . ., "144 Thus, "the challenged peer review arrangement
is logically and temporally unconnected to the transfer of risk accomplished by
[defendant's] insurance policies."' 145
137. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
138. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Pireno, fee review arrangements involving outside
groups had been the subject of inconsistent lower court opinions, although the majority of decisions
had concluded that they were within the "business of insurance." See. e.g., Bartholomew v. Virginia
Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1979) (exemption available), aff'g 451 F. Supp. 624
(W.D. Va. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980). But see, e.g., Pireno v. New York State Chiro-
practic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1981) (exemption unavailable), rev'g 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,758 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
139. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
140. Plaintiff also had sued the New York State Chiropractic Association (NYSCA), a profes-
sional association of chiropractors, which had established the peer review committee.
141. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 134.
142. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
143. "The transfer of risk from insured to insurer is effected by means of the contract between
the parties-the insurance policy-and that transfer is complete at the time that tlhe contract is
entered." Pireno, 458 U.S. at 130.
144. Id. (quoting Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir.
1981)).
145. Id. The Court rejected defendant's argument that the peer review procedure was part of the
risk transfer because it helped to determine both whether the risk had been transferred at all, and if
so, the scope of that transfer:
Petitioner's argument contains the unspoken premise that the transfer of risk from an in-
sured to his insurer actually takes place not when the contract between those parties is
completed, but rather only when the insured's claim is settled. This premise is contrary to
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Applying the second criterion, the Court noted that the peer review ar-
rangement "is obviously distinct from [defendant's] contracts with its policy-
holders." 14 6 The company's "use of [the] Peer Review Committee as an aid in
its decisionmaking process is a matter of indifference to the policyholder, whose
only concern is whether his claim is paid, not why it is paid."1' 47 Because the
challenged arrangements were between the insurer and third parties who were
not engaged in the business of insurance, this second requirement was not
satisfied.
This conclusion also was dispositive of the third criterion-whether the
practice was limited to entities within the insurance industry-since defendant's
"use of [the] Peer Review Committee inevitably involve[d] third parties wholly
outside the insurance industry-namely, chiropractors."' 148 Although this
outside involvement was not necessarily fatal to the defense, it was important
because the participation of noninsurers increased the likelihood of an adverse
competitive impact beyond the insurance industry. This adverse impact would
be inconsistent with a congressional intent only to immunize conduct that truly
was within the "business of insurance."
Arrangements between insurance companies and parties outside the
insurance industry can hardly be said to lie at the center of that legisla-
tive concern. More importantly, such arrangements may prove con-
trary to the spirit as well as the letter of § 2(b), because they have the
potential to restrain competition in non-insurance markets.149
Although the Court viewed its decision in Pireno as the natural extension
of Royal Drug, ' 0 the decision appears to extend the reach of the antitrust laws
and limit the scope of state supervision considerably beyond the legislative intent
in 1945.151 As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent, the claims adjustment
function performed by the peer review board is "at the heart of the relationship
between insurance companies and their policyholders."' 152 "Few insurance mat-
ters could be of greater importance to policyholders than whether their claims
will be paid, and it is the peer review committee which in effect makes that
determination." 153 Since few insurers could afford to employ physicians for the
sake of internalizing this claims adjustment process, the use of a competent and
experienced professional review panel was important both for the insurer and its
the fundamental principle of insurance that the insurance policy defines the scope of risk
assumed by the insurer to the insured.
Id. at 131.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 132.
148. Id. at 133.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 129.
151. The dissent noted that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was similar to the proposal of the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners. This proposal listed seven practices that expressly
were exempt from the Sherman Act, one of which was the process of claims adjustment. Id. at 138-
39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 135 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor joined in
Justice Rehnquist's dissent.
153. Id. at 137 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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policyholders. Thus, as far as the insured was concerned, these determinations
were the very essence of the "business of insurance."
The Court's Pireno decision has important implications that extend beyond
the peer review system in controversy. By making both the second and third of
Royal Drug's three factors turn on the involvement of outsiders, the Court has
made it virtually impossible to bring almost any relationship of an insurance
company, other than with policyholders or industry members, within the "busi-
ness of insurance." In addition to provider agreements and fee review arrange-
ments, a broad range of other insurance company activities now will be subject
to antitrust scrutiny.
Since Pireno, only one court has analyzed the applicability of the antitrust
laws to fee review arrangements. 154 Not surprisingly, it concluded that the chal-
lenged conduct did not fall within the "business of insurance." Defendant Blue
Shield had entered into agreements with the overwhelming majority of physi-
cians in the District of Columbia area to pay them directly their "usual, custom-
ary and reasonable" (UCR) fees for services rendered to its insureds. The fees of
"nonparticipating" physicians were paid only to the insured, who then was re-
sponsible for paying the physician. Pursuant to the insurance policy, Blue
Shield normally would not pay more than the UCR amount for these charges. If
a nonparticipating physician believed that his fee, which was higher than the
UCR level, was appropriate, that determination would be made by a committee
of participating physicians acting in an advisory role to Blue Shield. Finding
that these "peer review activities are indistinguishable from those in Pireno,"155
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that they
were beyond the "business of insurance" and therefore not immunized by Mc-
Carran-Ferguson. 15 6
A number of other insurance companies' activities involving or affecting
third parties have been the subject of scrutiny under the Royal Drug-Pireno
test. 15 7 In the majority of the cases, the conduct has not received the McCarran-
Ferguson exemption. More significantly, the range of conduct excluded from
the immunity by this test has expanded substantially-perhaps considerably be-
yond the 1945 Congress' intent. Even if the direct involvement of the insurance
companies with outsiders is minimal, the conduct has been excluded from the
exemption when it has some effect outside the insurance industry.
It has been held that the exemption does not apply to an agreement between
154. Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1983). See generally Borosody & Tiano,
Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws" An Analysis and A Proposal, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 511 (1982)
(modem analysis of fee review arrangement under the antitrust laws).
155. Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1267 (4th Cir. 1983).
156. Id. The court also held that the arrangements between Blue Shield and the participating
physicians in which the latter agreed to take no more than the UCR fee were "provider agreements"
outside the scope of the "business of insurance" as defined in Royal Drug. Id. at 1265-67.
157. In Royal Drug the Court offered several examples of conduct between an insurance com-
pany and outsiders that would not fall within the "business of insurance": an arrangement with a
bank for a line of credit to pay off its claims; a contract with a large retail drug chain whereby the
policyholders could obtain drugs under their policies only from stores operated by this chain, but at
a reduced price; or the acquisition by the insurer of a chain of drug stores to lower the insurer's
costs. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 213 n.9, 215 n.13.
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an insurer and certain health care providers in which the insurer refuses to make
direct payments to other providers for services obtained by the insurer's policy-
holders.158 Similarly, an agreement between an insurer and certain health care
providers permitting the conspirators to monopolize the market is not part of
the "business of insurance."' 159 The exemption also has been denied to a health
maintenance organization that allegedly paid discriminatory low prices to its
suppliers for drugs. 160
Not all lower court decisions after Pireno have held arrangments between
insurance companies and outsiders beyond the pale of the "business of insur-
ance." In Feinstein v. Nettleship Co.,t61 Nettleship, an underwriting manager for
medical malpractice insurance, and the Los Angeles County Medical Associa-
tion (LACMA) had entered into an agreement for the issuance of group insur-
ance. Nettleship promised not to limit its malpractice coverage to physicians
practicing in the low-risk areas of medicine, but to extend coverage to all
LACMA members, including those operating in high-risk areas. In exchange,
LACMA agreed that Nettleship would be LACMA's exclusive medical mal-
practice insurance agent. Although LACMA members were free to purchase
policies from sources other than Nettleship, a physician who wished to purchase
a policy offered by Nettleship had to be a member of LACMA. Eventually,
Nettleship obtained a large share of the medical malpractice insurance market in
southern California and then imposed substantial, successive rate increases.
Plaintiffs, a group of physicians in Los Angeles County, asserted that the
LACMA-Nettleship agreement constituted monopolization, conspiracy to mo-
nopolize, price-fixing, and an unlawful tying arrangement. 162
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, finding that the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act exempted the agreement and that the three requirements of
the Royal Drug-Pireno test were satisfied. First, the purpose of the agreement
was to guarantee coverage for physicians practicing in high-risk areas by distrib-
uting the risk across the whole LACMA membership. 163 Second, the agreement
involved the insurer-insured relationship, since Nettleship, the underwriter, was
158. See Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 483 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (discussed supra note 130 and accompanying text); see also
Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,154 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (activities
of medical association, through use of insurance company, to fix prices of physicians' services, held
not within "business of insurance").
159. See Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbert, 549 F. Supp. 1185, 1192-94 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); cf.
Blue Cross v. Kitsap Physician Serv., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,588 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (ex-
emption does not apply to health care insurer's bylaw that excluded from membership those physi-
cians who contracted to provide medical services to subscribers of any competing health
maintenance organization). But see Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 501 F.
Supp. 970, 993-94 (S.D. Iowa 1980) ("Since the relationship of insured to insurer is of central con-
cern herein, the challenge involves the 'business of insurance.' ").
160. See Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641, 647 (9th
Cir. 1981).
161. 714 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984).
162. Id. at 930.
163. Id. at 932.
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acting as an agent for the insurer.' 64 Last, although Royal Drug-Pireno re-
quired that the conduct in question be limited to entities within the insurance
industry, and although LACMA was neither the insurer nor the insured, 165
LACMA could be viewed as an agent for either the insurer or the insured be-
cause it operated as an intermediary of a group policy. Furthermore, LACMA's
presence in the relationship did not affect the policy goals of Royal Drug-Pireno,
which were to prevent McCarran-Ferguson from being used to restrain competi-
tion outside the insurance industry. "Thus Pireno appears to be satisfied where,
as here, the only role of the noninsurer is in negotiating the terms of the policy
relationship between insurer and insured, and the gravaman of the complaint is
lack of competition in the insurance market itself."' 66
The court of appeals' application of the third Royal Drug-Pireno require-
ment is a fair one. Not only was the involvement of an "outsider" not critical to
the underlying conduct under scrutiny, but it also was essential for the provision
of group insurance-a device that "occup[ies] an increasingly large share of the
overall insurance market in the United States."' 167 Thus, the pragmatic ap-
proach of the court, rejecting a mechanical application of the "outside entity"
criterion, is a welcome policy decision.168 A stricter application of this require-
ment would have resulted in a definition of the "business of insurance" narrower
than that intended by Congress.
Through its decisions in Pireno and Royal Drug, the Supreme Court has
narrowed the scope of the "business of insurance" to the point that not only
almost all provider agreements and peer review boards will fall outside the defi-
nition, but so will many other activities of insurance companies with noninsur-
ance entities. 16 9 Although the scope of the exemption Congress sought to confer
in 1945 admittedly is not clear, it is probable that the Court's recent decisions
are inconsistent with the earlier Congress' general intent. Unless Congress takes
the unlikely step of amending the exemption, however, it is likely that the trend
towards restricted application of McCarran-Ferguson will continue.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. For other recent decisions holding certain insurer-outsider activities within the "business of
insurance," see Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d
1276 (9th Cir. 1983); Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 501 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.
Iowa 1980).
169. See generally Nedrow, The McCarran Controversy: Insurance and the Antitrust Law, 12
CONN. L. REv. 205 (1980) (discussing gradual narrowing of exemptions for tying arrangements,
agency relationships, insurance company mergers, and service provider transactions); Comment,
The McCarran Act's Antitrust Exemption for the "Business of Insurance'" A Shrinking Umbrella, 43
TENN. L. REv. 329 (1976) (stating that modem trend of cases is narrowing the scope of the "busi-
ness of insurance" exemption); Note, The Definition of "Business of lnsurance" Under the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act After Royal Drug, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1475 (1980) (discussing narrowing of
exemption for referral arrangements, tying arrangements, and insurer-agent agreements).
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2. Relations Between Insurance Companies
A variety of agreements between insurance companies have been challenged
as unlawful under the antitrust laws, and in those actions the McCarran-Fergu-
son defense also has been asserted. Among the more commonly litigated prac-
tices have been agreements on the determination of rate premiums, cooperation
on the amount to be paid to insureds pursuant to claims, and mergers between
two insurance companies. Although many of these activities have been held
within the "business of insurance," the immunity has been denied to a number
of other practices. In almost all cases the courts have applied the Royal Drug-
Pireno standard or its variants and predecessors to determine whether the chal-
lenged conduct was the "business of insurance."
It is clear that agreements between insurance companies about their rates
are within the "business of insurance." Given the long history of state regula-
tion designed to prevent insurance companies from charging injuriously low or
rapaciously high rates,170 it is not surprising that the Royal Drug Court stated
that "the primary concern of both representatives of the insurance industry and
the Congress [in 1945] was that cooperative ratemaking efforts be exempt from
the antitrust laws." 171 Lower court decisions preceding 172 and following' 73
Royal Drug and Pireno have reached similar conclusions. 174
A number of other essentially horizontal arrangements between insurance
companies that affect the scope or amount of coverage afforded to an insured or
that indirectly affect the premium paid by the insured also have been held within
the "business of insurance." An agreement between automobile insurance com-
panies to share data on the costs of services charged by garages and parts com-
panies and then not to pay their insureds more than a common maximum
"reasonable" price for repairs based on the cost data was held to be within the
McCarran-Ferguson exemption.175 The use of a rating bureau by several insur-
170. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
171. RoyalDrug, 440 U.S. at 221; see also National Sec., 393 U.S. at 460 ("Certainly the fixing of
rates is part of this business; that is what South-Eastern Underwriters was all about. .. .")
172. See, eg., Meicler v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1975); see also
Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1182-83 (6th Cir. 1971) (McCarran-Fergu-
son applied because cooperative rate setting was adequately regulated by state); Steingart v. Equita-
ble Life Assurance Soc'y, 366 F. Supp. 790, 794-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); cf. California League of
Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (agree-
ment among insurers to set lower commission rates to agents immunized); infra notes 230-231 and
accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., In re Workers' Compensation Ins. Antitrust Litigation, 574 F. Supp. 525, 529-31
(D. Minn. 1983) (distinguishing Royal Drug and Pireno; tripartite test applies only to "ancillary
activities carried on by insurance companies" and not to "blatant price fixing").
174. But see First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 1147, 1153-54
(D.S.D. 1982) (agreement fixing price for abstractor's countersignatures on title insurance policies
"too far removed from the business of title insurance to warrant a McCarran Act exemption"),
aff'd, 714 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709 (1984).
175. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 318-25 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982); Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1201 (7th
Cir. 1981) (alternate holding), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); see also Grant v. Erie Ins, Exch.,
542 F. Supp. 457, 461-63 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (collection of statistical data and agreement to fix the
extent of coverage regarding work loss benefits paid to insureds are part of "business of insurance").
But see Custom Auto Body, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,629 at
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ers was held to be part of the "business of insurance" because it involved the
underwriting of risks.17 6 The insurers used the bureaus to divide the market by
having some insurers offer attractive group policy rates and others offer only
higher-priced, individual coverage or by having the various insurers offer differ-
ent kinds of coverage. Similarly, the agreement by title insurance companies,
using the vehicle of an insurance rating bureau to impose a uniform charge on
sellers of real estate when the buyers obtained title insurance, was held part of
the "business of insurance."1
77
The application of the business-of-insurance standard to mergers between
insurance companies has received inconsistent treatment from the courts. In
part, courts have looked to the purpose and effect of the transaction, including
whether the merger would afford better services or lower rates to policyholders,
in determining whether immunity exists.
Only one Supreme Court decision, SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,178 has
dealt with this question. The acquisition by defendant insurer of another insur-
ance company had been approved by the Arizona State Insurance Commis-
sioner. The SEC alleged that the acquiring company violated the antifraud
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934179 by failing to make certain
disclosures to stockholders of the acquired company. Defendant argued that
federal scrutiny was preempted by McCarran-Ferguson because of the express
approval of the transaction by a state official. Because no claim alleged that the
underlying transaction itself violated section 7 of the Clayton Act,180 the case
did not raise any antitrust issues; rather, at issue was whether McCarran-Fergu-
son preempted the application of another federal statute. 181 The Court held that
the activity under scrutiny-the nondisclosure of certain material facts to stock-
holders-was not part of the "relationship between the insurance company and
the policyholder";182 since this was one of the relevant criteria for determining
69,187 n.16 (D.R.I. 1983) ("[Ihe Court. . .need not decide whether an agreement between insur-
ance companies to fix the price of automobile repairs would be immune under the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act.").
176. See Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218, 224-32 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981). The court stated:
[I]t is clear that at least the following activities are the business of insurance . . . .
preparing and filing a rating-schedule, either on behalf of an individual company or jointly
through a rating bureau; 2. deciding upon rating classification differences between individ-
ual policies and group marketing plans, either individually or jointly through a rating bu-
reau ....
Id. at 225-26.
177. See Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974); see
also Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77, 86 (10th Cir. 1973) (price
fixing, price discrimination, and monopolistic practices by insurers all held part of "business of in-
surance"). But see supra note 99 (noting controversy whether title insurance is "insurance").
178. 393 U.S. 453 (1969). This case is discussed supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
179. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
18 1. No question of the legality or illegality of the merger, standing alone, was raised. "The
gravamen of the complaint was the misrepresentation, not the merger. The merger became relevant
only insofar as it was necessary to attack it in order to undo the harm caused by the alleged decep-
tion." National Sec., 393 U.S. at 462.
182. Id. at 460.
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the "business of insurance," the transaction was not exempt. This conclusion
was reinforced by the fact that the state and the federal statutory regimes were
designed to protect different interests-the state insurance system was protective
of policyholders, whereas the federal securities laws were enacted to protect pur-
chasers and sellers of securities. Thus, there was no "impairment" by federal
regulation of any state interest. "Different questions would, of course, arise if
the Federal Government were attempting to regulate in the sphere reserved pri-
marily to the States by the McCarran-Ferguson Act."18 3
National Securities highlights the ambiguous treatment of insurance com-
pany mergers. Although an alleged fraudulent nondisclosure to stockholders
indeed does not affect the insurance policyholders, other aspects of mergers
might affect this relationship more directly and therefore could satisfy the Royal
Drug-Pireno test.
The issue avoided in National Securities-the application of section 7 of the
Clayton Act to a merger involving insurance companies-subsequently has been
considered by lower federal courts. In American General Insurance Co. v.
FTC,184 an insurance company sought to enjoin the FTC from challenging a
merger agreement between plaintiff and another insurance company on the
ground that the approval of the transaction by state insurance authorities in the
two states in which the parties to the merger were incorporated conferred Mc-
Carran-Ferguson immunity. The court rejected this argument, concluding that
since "the competitive aspects of these mergers [are] certainly a subject far re-
moved from the relationship between the insurance company and the policy-
holder contemplated in National Securities,"' 185 the scrutiny of the transaction
under federal law was not preempted.
In Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co.,1 8 6 an in-
sured challenged the acquisitions by a title insurance company of other insur-
ance companies, asserting that one result of these acquisitions was an overcharge
in the title insurance it purchased.' 8 7 After characterizing plaintiff's basic claim
as an assertion that the mergers affected the premium rate-they resulted in
noncompetitive pricing-the court concluded that the conduct clearly was
within the "business of insurance."' 88
This result can be viewed as consistent with other McCarran-Ferguson ju-
risprudence. The principal anticompetitive effects of horizontal mergers are the
elimination of the competition that formerly prevailed between the companies
with a resulting increase in monopoly power and higher prices; in addition, the
creation of one larger company as a substitute for two smaller entities may have
adverse effects on existing competitors and may deter new entry. Although hori-
183. Id. at 463.
184. 359 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1974).
185. Id. at 897. Rather, "[t]he relationship involved in the merger of insurance companies is in
essence one between individual companies and between companies seeking to merge and the industry
as a whole." Id. at 896-97.
186. 477 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973).
187. Id. at 86.
188. Id.
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zontal price fixing will have many of these same effects, it is clear that this form
of intra-industry cooperation is sanctioned by McCarran-Ferguson. Thus, it is
arguable that mergers or acquisitions should be treated no differently.
After Royal Drug and Pireno, however, it is likely that the treatment of
these transactions will depend less on a characterization of their competitive
effect than on a rigorous analysis under the Court's tripartite test. 189 Although
a merger may affect costs, it is less directly related to the risk-spreading or un-
derwriting function than is the setting of common rates. Perhaps more impor-
tant, looking at the second prong, mergers are related only indirectly to the
insurer-insured relationship. The effect of a merger on the rights and responsi-
bilities of the policyholders or the insurer is no more direct than are many other
activities of insurance companies that are deemed not part of the "business of
insurance." Given the important national policies reflected by section 7 of the
Clayton Act, it is preferable to submit acquisitions by insurance companies to
the same competitive yardstick as those by noninsurance entities.19 0
Finally, a few other horizontal relationships between insurance companies
that are peripheral to their central activities of setting rates, paying claims, and
defining risks also have been held outside of the "business of insurance." Some
examples of these activities include agreements between health maintenance or-
ganizations limiting insureds only to certain providers or requiring that the serv-
ices of certain providers be referred by other providers, 19' and concerted action
by insurers to drive another insurer out of business in an attempt to monopolize
the market. 192
3. Relations Between Insurer and Insured
Relationships between the insurance company and its insureds have the po-
tential for adverse effects on competition and normally would be subject to anti-
trust scrutiny. For the most part, however, these relations have been deemed
part of the "business of insurance" and therefore within the McCarran-Ferguson
exemption.
The most frequently litigated insurer-insured activities have been tying ar-
rangements; these are sales arrangements whereby the seller insists that the
189. Cf Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 215 n.13 ("If a merger between two insurance companies is not
the 'business of insurance,' then an acquisition by an insurer of a manufacturer or a retail chain,
although conceptually indistinguishable from the Pharmacy Agreements in this case, is also not the
'business of insurance.' ").
190. Cf. United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d 428, 455 (9th Cir. 1981) (interlocking
directorates between commercial banks and insurance companies "may not be part of the 'business
of insurance' "; Clayton Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982), held applicable to transaction on other
grounds; see infra note 278), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bankamerica Corp. v. United States,
103 S. Ct. 2266 (1983).
191. See Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 689 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1982).
192. See Escrow Disbursement Ins. Agency, Inc. v. American Title & Ins. Co., 550 F. Supp.
1192, 1196-97 (S.D. Fla. 1982); see also Devoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 874,
876 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (breach of exclusive contract between plaintiff insurer and mortgage banker in
favor of contract between that banker and defendant insurer, a competitor of plaintiff, not within
"business of insurance"), rev'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894
(1975).
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buyer take a second product, the tied product, as a condition of being able to
purchase the first or tying product.1 93 The tying arrangement cases have in-
volved situations in which the insurance contract has been alternately the tying
or the tied product. In the majority of decisions, these arrangements have been
held to be part of the "business of insurance" and therefore immunized from
antitrust scrutiny. More recent decisions, however, particularly those decided
after Royal Drug and Pireno, have been less willing to confer the exemption.
Other relationships between insurer and insured also have been analyzed.
In the majority of these cases, the exemption has been found inapplicable. This
section will examine both tying arrangements and these other relationships. 194
In one variety of tying arrangement, the insurance policy is the tied prod-
uct; the insurance company refuses to sell some product or service unless the
purchaser also obtains an insurance policy from it. An often-cited example of
such conduct is Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.195 Defendant in-
surer conditioned the securing of a homeowner's loan on simultaneous purchase
by the borrower of a cash value life insurance policy. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plain-
tiff's complaint, concluding that this activity was indeed part of the "business of
insurance." In this pre-Royal Drug-Pireno decision, the court focused on the
criterion identified by National Securities196 -whether the activity involved the
relationship between insurer and insured.' 97 Because the tying arrangement
clearly fell within this relationship, McCarran-Ferguson applied.' 98
Similar results have been reached in subsequent cases involving insurance
as the tied product. In Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,199 a case
similar on its facts to Addrisi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
193. For a detailed discussion of tying arrangements, see 4 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAW §§ 32.1-.60 (1984); 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 10.52-.64 (1980); Bauer, A
Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 VAND. L. REV. 283
(1980).
194. See generally Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77, 86
(10th Cir. 1973) (relationship between policyholder and agent treated same way as relationship be-
tween policyholder and insurance company: "[I]n applying the McCarran Act, we see no reason to
distinguish between a principal and an agent. It would appear to us that an insurance agent, as well
as an insurance company, is engaged in the 'business of insurance.' ").
195. 503 F.2d 725, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
196. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); see supra notes 67-76 and accompanying
text.
197. "The McCarran-Ferguson Act was an attempt to turn back the clock, to assure that the
activities of insurance companies in dealing with their policyholders would remain subject to state
regulation." National Sec., 393 U.S. at 459.
198. An earlier district court decision, Fry v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 355 F. Supp.
1151 (N.D. Tex. 1973), had concluded that such tying arrangements were not part of the "business
of insurance." After Addrisi was decided, this district court vacated and modified its earlier order,
accepting the conclusion that such tying arrangements are within the exemption. Fry v. John Han.
cock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,728 (N.D. Tex. 1975). The facts in Fry,
however, are distinguishable from Addrisi, and a conclusion that the exemption should not apply
would have been justified even if one accepts the Addrisi holding. In Fry defendant insurer offered
farm loans on the condition that the borrower purchase either irrigation systems or life insurance
policies from the insurer. When neither the tying nor the tied product is insurance, it is hard to
assert that this transaction involves the "business of insurance" merely because the lender happens
to be engaged principally in that business.
199. 527 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Circuit concluded that this conduct, while arguably anticompetitive, nonetheless
was not subject to antitrust challenge.20° "Forcing people to buy insurance may
well be an undesirable practice-and we do not suggest that we approve of it-
but it is part of the 'business of insurance.' "201
In several post-Royal Drug-Pireno actions involving the use of insurance as
a tied product by companies not principally engaged in the sale of insurance,
courts have reached contrary conclusions. 20 2 An examination of the analysis in
one such case, FTC v. Manufacturers Hanover Credit Services, Inc.,203 illustrates
the current approach. During FTC investigations of certain credit practices by
noninsurance company lenders, the Commission sought judicial enforcement of
Civil Investigative Demands. The FTC asserted that the conduct of these lend-
ers, requiring their customers to purchase credit insurance from them as a pre-
requisite to the extension of credit, amounted to unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.20 4 In resisting compliance
with the demands, the respondents asserted that their activities were not the
proper subject of FTC investigation because of the McCarran-Ferguson
exemption.
Using the three-pronged Royal Drug-Pireno test, the district court deter-
mined that the conduct sought to be investigated was not the "business of insur-
ance." Applying the first criterion, the court conceded that credit insurance
might spread risks both for the lenders and borrowers; it then stated, however,
that "[r]isk spreading is an indispensible element . . but its presence is not
determinative. '205
The court then found that neither the second nor the third criterion was
met. First, concluding that the practice did not involve the insurer-insured rela-
tionship, the court noted that the challenged practice was the requirement that
borrowers purchase credit insurance. Although this could have been character-
ized as an insurer-insured relationship, the court instead held that it primarily
involved a creditor-debtor or buyer-seller relationship to which insurance was
merely incidental. 20 6 Then, applying the final Royal Drug-Pireno factor-
200. Id. at 235. But see Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974) (con-
spiracy between insurance company and provider that insureds could use services only of certain
providers not shielded by McCarran-Ferguson), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975).
201. Dexter, 527 F.2d at 235.
202. See FTC v. Dixie Fin. Co., 695 F.2d 926 (5th Cir.) (affirming and adopting district court's
opinion), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2088 (1983); FTC v. Manufacturers Hanover Consumer Servs.,
Inc., 567 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also General Fin. Corp. v. FTC, 700 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.
1983) (courts lack jurisdiction to enjoin FTC from investigating credit insurance activities; merits of
McCarran-Ferguson exemption not reached); Audobon Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, 543 F. Supp. 1362
(M.D. La. 1982) (same); FTC v. Manufacturers Hanover Consumer Servs., Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1071
(E.D. Pa. 1982). See generally Polden, The Antitrust Implications of Credit Insurance Tying Ar-
rangements, 32 DRAKE L. REv. 861 (1982-83) (discussing credit insurance tying arrangements).
203. 567 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
205. Id. at 995.
206. The court's hostility to the McCarran-Ferguson exemption is exemplified in one revealing
passage: "Where possible to characterize the practice either broadly so that the activity appears to
be part of the relationship between insurer and the insured, or narrowly so that it appears otherwise,
the latter path should be followed." Id.
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whether the practice was limited to entities within the insurance industry-the
court properly noted that the subjects of the investigation were not principally
insurance companies, but rather were credit institutions or automobile sellers for
whom credit insurance was merely incidental and secondary.207
The majority of the decisions also treat a tying arrangement as part of the
"business of insurance" when the policy is the tying product. Thus, it is not
unlawful for an issuer of automobile insurance to require that the purchaser also
obtain membership in an automobile club,208 or for the issuer of title insurance
to require that purchasers of homes also obtain a mechanic's lien insurance pol-
icy. 209 The exemption also has been held applicable to a health maintenance
organization's practice of requiring its insureds to fill their prescriptions through
its own pharmacy and denying reimbursement under the insurance contract for
certain prescriptions filled at independent pharmacies, 210 and to its requirement
that persons who seek to purchase "pharmacy benefits" coverage also must
purchase a basic health care insurance contract.2 11
The effect that Royal Drug and Pireno will have on these kinds of tie-in
cases is unclear. On the one hand, as one of the FTC investigation cases noted
in refusing to rely on Addrisi and Dexter,212 "these decisions have lost their
viability and are distinguishable in light of. . .Royal Drug. .... -213 It indeed
does seem questionable whether a requirement that a purchaser of a noninsur-
ance product also purchase an insurance policy satisfies the second criterion,
because the complained-of conduct only tangentially involves the insurer-in-
207. This factor was rejected by Judge Reavley, dissenting in FTC v. Dixie Fin. Co., 695 F.2d
926 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2088 (1983). Noting that the exemption was for the "business
of insurance" rather than the "business of insurers," he argued that as long as the finance companies
were using restraints to sell insurance policies, their principal line of business was "irrelevant." Id.
at 932 (Reavley, J., dissenting); see also Zelson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 549 F.2d 62 (8th Cir.
1977) (tying arrangement between insurance company, which also was a securities broker-dealer
through an affiliate, and its agent, requiring as condition of retention of insurance agency that agent
also sell securities only through the affiliate, held not part of "business of insurance").
208. Mathis v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 410 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
209. McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976). But see supra
note 99 (noting controversy whether title insurance is "insurance").
210. See Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutial Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276,
1288-90 (9th Cir.) (arrangement involved only one "product"; because there were not two separate
products, no need to reach business-of-insurance issue), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 88 (1983). But see
Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 198 1) (in
view of recent Royal Drug decision, premature to decide defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment); Homestead Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Foremost Corp., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,343 (N.D.
Tex. 1985) (Royal Drug and Dixie Finance, supra note 202, undercut Dexter and Addrisi holdings).
211. Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276,
1284-87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 88 (1983). This "tying" requirement satisfied all three
prongs of the Royal Drug test:
The insurer-insured agreement embodied in the basic health care contract and its supple-
mental pharmacy benefit settles the distribution of the risk that insureds will need medical
goods and services, including prescription drugs. It defines the relationship between in-
surer and insured. And it is limited to these two traditional actors in the insurance
industry.
Id. at 1286.
212. See supra notes 195-201.
213. FTC v. Dixie Fin. Co., 695 F.2d 926, 931 (5th Cir.) (adopting district court opinion), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 2088 (1983).
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sured relationship. On the other hand, as that same case noted, the FTC investi-
gations were of noninsurance companies and hence the third criterion also was
unsatisfied.214 When the tying arrangement is the practice of an insurer and
neither involves an outsider to the industry nor has an adverse competitive im-
pact outside the industry, the basic concern of Royal Drug and Pireno to limit
the exemption to the traditional, insurance-related activities of insurers would
seem to be satisfied.
One meaningful difference might lie in whether the insurance policy is the
tying or the tied product.215 When the insurance policy is the tying product, it
is what the defendant is principally engaged in selling and is the product desired
by the purchaser. Such a transaction seems at the heart of a sale of insurance,
the "business" of insurance. On the other hand, when the insurer is principally
selling a noninsurance product-making a loan, selling a car, or the like-and
conditions the right to purchase that product on the simultaneous purchase of
insurance, treating this transaction as the "business of insurance" effectively
would allow the tail to wag the dog. Even though the transaction resembles
insurance in that it allows the seller to spread to all purchasers the risk that the
purchaser of a noninsurance product will be unable to make full payment, it
does not involve the basic insurer-insured relationship. Moreover, by allowing
the seller to employ its market power in the noninsurance product to force the
purchase of insurance, the transaction can have anticompetitive effects outside
the insurance industry, one of the principal concerns of the Court in Royal Drug
and Pireno.216 Thus, these kinds of tying arrangements should be subject to
normal antitrust scrutiny.
Many other activities between an insurance company and its insureds also
fall within the "business of insurance." Perhaps the clearest example is the de-
termination of the amount of benefits to be paid pursuant to a claim.217 In
addition, the restriction in automobile insurance policies limiting reimbursement
to the insured only to the reasonable and competitive costs of repair, even if this
could be viewed as resulting in a horizontal conspiracy among the insureds to
use their buying power to reduce prices in the provider market, so directly in-
volves the insurer-insured relationship that it also is within the "business of
insurance.12 18
214. "Were the respondents in this matter insurance companies, the holdings of Dexter and
Addrisi might carry more weight. . . . [T]he conduct being investigated does not relate to respon-
dents as insureds, but as finance companies whose methods of inducing potential borrowers to
purchase insurance is an integral part of the arrangement of credit and not the 'business of insur-
ance.'" Id.
215. When insurance policies are both the tying and the tied products-the insured must take
two kinds of policies or none at all-the "business of insurance" requirement is satisfied. Anglin v.
Blue Shield, 693 F.2d 315, 320-21 (4th Cir. 1982); see infra text accompanying note 334.
216. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
217. See Freier v. New York Life Ins. Co., 679 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Mulhearn
v. Rose-Neath Funeral Home, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1981) (specification in insurance
policy of "authorized provider" and providing lower benefits to insured for services of "unauthor-
ized provider" held within "business of insurance").
218. See Custom Auto Body, Inc., v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,629 (D.R.I. 1983); see also Lowe v. Aarco-American, Inc., 536 F.2d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1970)
(sale and financing of automobile insurance policies included within "business of insurance," even
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On the other hand, as a result of Royal Drug and Pireno a number of activi-
ties by insurance companies other than tying arrangements directed principally
at the policyholders have been held to be outside the "business of insurance."
These decisions, however, may be taking far too limited a view of the scope of
the "business of insurance." In one recent case, 2 19 defendant health care in-
surer, Blue Cross, instituted a policy of reimbursing its policyholders only for a
CAT scan performed at a hospital and not for those performed by physicians
using a privately-owned CAT scanner. Plaintiff-physician, who owned and op-
erated a CAT scanner, complained that Blue Cross' policy was an unlawful boy-
cott of his services; in response, Blue Cross asserted that its decision was part of
the "business of insurance. ' '220
Applying the three Royal Drug-Pireno criteria, the district court concluded
that the McCarran-Ferguson defense was unavailable. The conduct did not in-
volve the risk-spreading function because "Blue Cross' decision not to reimburse
for physician-owned scanners is not an underwriting decision but rather a cost
reduction decision. '22 1 The court probably was wrong; this decision concerned
which claims would be paid and therefore what risks would have to be under-
written and ultimately shared by the policyholders.
Of greater significance was the court's use of the second and third criteria to
take this decision on the scope of coverage-something typically thought to be
part of the relationship between an insurer and its insureds-outside of the
"business of insurance." The court first concluded that these decisions by Blue
Cross were not "an integral part of the policy relationship" because they only
determined from whom the insured could obtain treatment and not what kinds
of incidents were covered; consequently, they did not affect "the benefit con-
ferred on the subscriber. ' 222 This view is too narrow because the authorized
providers of care, as well as the insured-for incidents, are elements of the insur-
ance agreement and are rights for which the insured pays a determined
premium.
The court also concluded that the third criterion-"whether the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry"-was unsatisfied because Blue
Cross' decision "inevitably involves third parties outside the insurance indus-
though seller was finance company and not insurance company; challenge was under Truth in Lend-
ing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982) dismissed). But see Cody v. Community Loan Corp., 606 F.2d 499,
503 (5th Cir. 1979) (lending activities of insurance company not part of "business of insurance";
federal Truth in Lending Act not preempted), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980); Perry v, Fidelity
Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987 (1980); Cochran
v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1979) (lending activities of insurance premium finance company
not part of "business of insurance"; federal Truth in Lending Act not preempted). These cases are
discussed in Annot., 51 A.L.R. FED. 743 (1981).
219. Trident Neuro-Imaging Laboratory v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 568 F. Supp. 1474 (D.S.C.
1983).
220. Id. at 1479.
221. Id. at 1482. The court explained its narrow view of the "underwriting" requirement:
"[C]ases since Royal Drug seem to hold that only the core activities of a traditional insurance com-
pany, viz., the underwriting and risk spreading functions, fall within the MeCarran-Ferguson Act
exemption for the business of insurance." Id.
222. Id. at 1483.
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try-namely neurologists. '223 This conclusion also extends the Royal Drug-
Pireno test too far. The test should be whether outsiders are involved in the
decision, not merely whether they are affected. 224 Conduct by an insurance
company, be it with other insurers, with its agents, or with its insureds, will only
infrequently not "affect" outsiders. Continuation of this narrow approach will
reduce the McCarran-Ferguson exemption far beyond what Congress intended
in 1945. Thus, although occasional exceptional situations will arise, 225 the gen-
eral rule should be that the broad range of relationships between an insurance
company and its insured should be deemed part of the "business of insurance."
4. Relations Between Insurance Companies and Other Parties
in the Insurance Industry
Relationships between insurance companies-horizontal agreements be-
tween competing insurers-generally have been deemed within the "business of
insurance. '22 6 Relationships within the insurance industry of a primarily verti-
cal nature have received somewhat less positive treatment, although more often
than not they too have been held to be within the McCarran-Ferguson exemp-
tion.2 27 These arrangements between an insurer and a person acting as its sales
or claims agent generally are immunized when the other party is acting as an
intermediary with the policyholder and when the direct relationship itself would
be part of the "business of insurance. '"228
The relationship between an insurance company and its agents often is at
the core of the "insurance business." Nonetheless, whether it is within the
"business of insurance" must depend on the nature and effect of the particular
challenged activities.229 Because it is clear that McCarran-Ferguson authorizes
223. Id.
224. The court did note that "plaintiffs have alleged that hospital physicians and others influ-
enced Blue Cross' decision not to reimburse. To that extent, third parties outside the insurance
industry were involved in the decision-making process." Id. Not only was this a supplemental
ground for the court's decision, because apparently it was enough that the outsiders were "affected,"
but reliance on this relatively minor outsider participation itself illustrates the considerable extension
of the significance of Royal Drug's pharmacy agreements and Pireno's peer review committees,
225. See, e.g., Cody v. Community Loan Corp., 606 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1979) (lending
activities of insurance company not part of "business of insurance"; federal Truth In Lending Act
not preempted), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980); Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d
468 (5th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987 (1980).
226. See supra notes 170-92 and accompanying text.
227. For a general discussion of relations between insurance companies and other parties in the
insurance industry, see Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946) (state statute regulating agents
for out-of-state insurance companies not unlawful under either commerce clause or due process
clause; unnecessary to consider McCarran-Ferguson exemption).
228. See, e.g., Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77, 86 (10th
Cir. 1973) ("In applying the McCarran Act, we see no reason to distinguish between a principal and
an agent. It would appear to us that an insurance agent, as well as an insurance company, is engaged
in the 'business of insurance.' ").
229. Another issue frequently arising out of the insurer-agent relationship is whether certain
challenged agency contract provisions and the various enforcement activities undertaken by the in-
surer constitute a boycott under § 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Crum
& Forster, 611 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); Card v. National Life Ins.
Co., 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979); Seidner v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
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joint rate-setting activity by insurers230 and the rate of commission paid to
agents is a vital factor in the insurers' rate-making structure, it generally is as-
sumed that the "business of insurance" also extends to agreements between in-
surers concerning those commission rates. 23 1
The status of exclusive arrangements with agents, limiting those agents to
representing only one or a few insurance companies or prohibiting them from
engaging in any noninsurance business, has proven more troubling. In the ma-
jority of cases, however, when the exclusive agency restrictions were part of the
overall insurer-agent relationship, courts have treated them as within the "busi-
ness of insurance. '232 These arrangements have a sufficiently direct link with
the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholders; they af-
fect the reliability of the company's representatives and the care and attention
given to policyholders.
Certain other arrangements between an insurance company and its agents
also have been held within the "business of insurance." The exemption applies
to: a restriction on the types of persons to whom agents may sell insurance; 233 a
requirement that upon termination of the agency certain documents and records
must be returned to the insurance company;234 and an alleged tying arrange-
ment in which the continuation of plaintiff's agency was conditioned on his han-
dling the full range of defendant insurer's line of policies. 235
The approach taken by the courts to these arrangements is illustrated in
Hopping v. Standard Life Insurance Co.236 An agent represented defendant in-
74,561 (N.D. Ill. 1970). See generally infra notes 300-54 and accompanying text (discussing the
scope of the boycott limitation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
230. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
231. See California League of Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp.
857 (N.D. Cal. 1959). The Supreme Court, however, has not yet resolved this issue. See Royal
Drug, 440 U.S. at 224 n.32 ("It is clear from the legislative history that the fixing of rates is the
'business of insurance.' The same conclusion does not so clearly emerge with respect to the fixing of
agents' commissions.").
232. See, e.g., Thompson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 644 F.2d 439, 442-44 (5th Cir. 1981);
Gribbin v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,798 (W.D. La.
1984); Steinberg v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 486 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Black v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 571 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1978); see also
Blackburn v. Crum & Forster, 611 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1980) (court apparently assumed that exclu-
sive dealing provision in agency agreement falls within "business of insurance"; held, termination of
agent not "boycott" under § 3(b) of Act), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); Card v. National Life
Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979) (same); Blackley v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 1976-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 61,061 (D. Utah 1976) (exclusive dealing requirement conceded by plaintiff to be
"business of insurance"; held, requirement is not "boycott" under § 3(b)). But see Ray v. United
Family Life Ins. Co., 430 F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (W.D.N.C. 1977) (A lawsuit challenging termination
of agent who did not agree to sell only defendant's policies "involves the relationship of agent and
company, not the relationship of policyholder and company. Refusal to deal with an agent does not
fall into [exempted] categories . . ").
233. Gribbin v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,798 (W.D.
La. 1984); see also Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218, 225-26 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[lit is
clear that at least the following activities are the business of insurance[:] . . . authorizing agents to
solicit individual or group policies; [and] accepting or rejecting coverages tendered by brokers,"),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
234. Gribbin v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,798 (W.D.
La. 1984).
235. Steinberg v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 486 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
236. 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,814 (N.D. Miss. 1983).
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surer, which sold only life, and not health, insurance; that insurance company
had an arrangement with Blue Cross, a seller of health insurance, whereby each
company would cooperate with the other in selling health and life insurance
packages. Defendant refused to renew plaintiff's agency appointment unless he
agreed not to encourage his customers to shift their health insurance business to
insurers other than Blue Cross. Applying the Royal Drug-Pireno criteria, the
court concluded that this conduct fell within the "business of insurance. '"237
On the other hand, certain other relationships between an insurance
company and its agents have been held beyond the scope of the "business of
insurance." In Zelson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. 238 plaintiff was en-
gaged in the sale of both insurance and securities; he alleged that defendant
insurance company engaged in an unlawful tying arrangement by terminating
his insurance agency contract after he refused to sell securities through an affili-
ate of defendant. Holding that this conduct would not be shielded by McCar-
ran-Ferguson, the court stressed that the chief impact of this restriction was not
in the insurance market, but in the securities field. 239 Because the requirement
that plaintiff sell only defendant's securities products did not affect the parties'
relationships with insurance policyholders, it was not part of the "business of
insurance." 240
It also has been held that McCarran-Ferguson does not extend to: an insur-
ance company's "pirating" of, and subsequent direct-dealing with, the subagents
of the plaintiff, its agent;24 1 a conspiracy by defendant insurance companies to
induce the agents of plaintiff, a competing insurer, to breach their contracts with
plaintiff and instead represent defendants; 242 or a conspiracy between an insur-
ance company and an insurance agency to steal from another insurance agency
various trade secrets and confidential information regarding the marketing of an
237. Id. Since plaintiff's conduct could have resulted in fewer persons continuing their health
insurance policies with Blue Cross, the restriction contributed to the insurers' attempts to spread
their policyholders' risks. The potential substitution of other insurance companies for Blue Cross
would destroy the relationship between that insurer and its insureds, would decrease the number of
its policyholders (and thus indirectly affect its risk spreading), and would affect the confidence poli-
cyholders would have both in Blue Cross and in defendant company. Finally, the restraints clearly
were limited only to parties within the insurance industry. Id.
238. 549 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1977).
239. Id. at 71.
240. The court distinguished two other tying arrangement cases, Dexter v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc'y, 527 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1975) and Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975) (discussed supra notes 195-201 and accompanying
text). In those cases, insurance was the tied product that the policyholder had to take as a condition
of obtaining a loan; in Zelson, on the other hand, the insurance agency was the tying product and the
agent was forced to accept the less desired securities representation as the tied product. Zelson, 549
F.2d at 66-68. This distinction demonstrated that in this case, the anticompetitive effect was on the
securities market, since other securities firms were foreclosed from making sales through plaintiff's
agency because of the restraint imposed by defendant.
241. See Allied Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 157 (D. Neb. 1976).
242. See American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Planned Mktg. Assocs., 389 F. Supp. 1141
(E.D. Va. 1974); see also Malley-Duff& Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,302 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (insurance company's termination of an agency contract within scrutiny of
antitrust laws where termination may have resulted from a conspiracy to boycott the agency and
eliminate it), rev'd on other grounds, 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1984).
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insurance policy. 24 3
5. Unilateral Activities by Insurance Companies
Certain decisions or actions by insurance companies undertaken unilater-
ally rather than in concert with others also may carry the potential of substan-
tially lessening competition. If the activity falls within the "business of
insurance," it too will be exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
A recent example of exempted unilateral activity is Mackey v. Nationwide
Insurance Co.2 4 4 Plaintiff, a former agent of defendant insurance company,
complained that defendant had adopted the practice of "redlining"-refusing to
write insurance polices for persons residing in predominantly black neighbor-
hoods. Without applying the Royal Drug-Pireno test, the court concluded that
the "claim [fell] squarely within the exemption provided by the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act."' 245 Indeed, reprehensible as defendant's practice was, the court's
conclusion is correct. It was part of the decision of whom to insure-part of the
underwriting or risk-taking aspect of insurance-and it went to the heart of the
insurer-insured relationship by determining the parties with whom the insurance
company was willing to establish such a relationship. 24 6 Similarly, the adoption
by an insurance company of a policy that resulted in the reduction of the
amount of benefits paid to the insured also was an essential element of this in-
surer-insured relationship and therefore was entitled to McCarran-Ferguson
immunity. 247
On the other hand, activities less central to the insurance enterprise or less
unique to the insurance industry are not entitled to the exemption. McCarran-
Ferguson was held inapplicable when an established insurance company alleged
that defendant, a relatively new and small insurance company, had tried to in-
duce plaintiff's agent to cease selling plaintiff's insurance and instead to sell de-
fendant's policies, and also had utilized plaintiff's trade secrets and customer
lists to induce plaintiff's policyholders to shift to coverage with defendant.248
These activities did not involve or affect the insurer-policyholder relationship;
rather, "the activities complained of could easily be employed by one stock bro-
kerage firm against another as by one insurance firm against another.12'19
Although defendant's conduct only involved competition within the insurance
industry, to the extent that these "unfair activities" rose to the level of potential
243. See Center Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Byers, 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,940 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
244. 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
245. Id. at 421. While dismissing plaintiff's Sherman Act claim, the court held that McCarran-
Ferguson did not bar actions under either the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968), or
the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1982). Mackey, 724 F.2d at 421.
246. Cf FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958) (challenge to alleged unfair adver-
tising immunized by § 2(b); no discussion of "business of insurance").
247. See Frier v. New York Life Ins. Co., 679 F.2d 780, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1982).
248. American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Planned Mktg. Assocs., 389 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D.
Va. 1974).
249. Id. at 1147; see also Center Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Byers, 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,940
(N.D. Ill. 1976) (discussed supra note 243 and accompanying text).
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antitrust violations, they properly were held subject to antitrust scrutiny.250 The
exemption does not apply to all of the "business of insurance companies," but
only that "business" which is "insurance"; under prevailing norms, acts such as
theft of confidential information or inducement of a breach of contract would
not be deemed to be within that "business."
Other interpretative problems can exist when the same entity operates both
as an insurer and as a provider of services. One increasingly common example
of such dual conduct is a health maintenance organization (HMO), an entity
that promises to provide all specified health care of the insured for a fixed fee. It
has been held, however, that the adoption by an HMO of a policy not to allow
certain providers to become members of these organizations is not exempt as the
"business of insurance." Applying the third of the Royal Drug-Pireno criteria, a
court noted that these "practices restrain competition in a provider market...
rather than in an insurance market. '251 When the principal effect of a restraint
is on competition outside the insurance industry, the exemption usually will be
unavailable. 25 2
These decisions again evidence the general trend toward a narrowing of the
"business of insurance."' 253 The exemption appears available only for the activi-
ties of traditional insurance companies, and then only with respect to the tradi-
tional and necessary acts of these companies. Furthermore, even when these
standards are satisfied, the exemption is unavailable if the activities have sub-
stantial effects on noninsurers. These continued restrictions on McCarran-Fer-
guson may deprive the states of the right to regulate insurers, and deprive
insurance companies of the protective umbrella that Congress intended to confer
in 1945. Although antitrust scrutiny of some of the more anticompetitive or
unfair practices may be desirable, the trend marks a shift from the balance
struck four decades ago to exempt a broad range of admittedly anticompetitive,
and hence otherwise unlawful, conduct.
B. Requirement of State Regulation
The McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the business of insurance from the
federal antitrust laws only "to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law."'2 54 Accordingly, after a court determines that the activity is within
250. Cf. USLIFE Corp. v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 560 F. Supp. 1302, 1306-08 (N.D. Tex. 1983)
(choice of company name not part of "business of insurance"; challenge under federal Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982), not preempted by McCarran-Ferguson).
251. Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 689 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1982).
252. "Although the Supreme Court [in Royal Drug] did not hold that [an] effect on non-insur-
ance markets was in itself sufficient to negate the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption,
arrangements whose primary impact is on competition in markets other than that for insurance do
not fall within the exemption." Id. at 844.
253. See also National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 628 F.2d 1050,
1057 (8th Cir. 1980) (refusal by health care insurer to enter into provider agreement with new,
private hospital is not part of "business of insurance"), aff'g 479 F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Mo. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
254. Section 2(b) of the Act provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted
by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee
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the "business of insurance," it then must ascertain whether the activity is "regu-
lated by state law."' 255 Two issues relating to this requirement have arisen:
First, the Act might require state regulation to be of a certain quality and extent
before federal laws will be preempted. Second, the statutory regulation of insur-
ance by one state could exempt insurance activities conducted in or having an
effect in another state, but which are not regulated by that second state.
1. Quality and Extent of State Regulation
The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not define "regulated by State law."
Thus, the Act itself is unclear whether more than some minimum level of state
regulation is required before the "business of insurance" is exempt from federal
antitrust laws. 256 Many commentators have interpreted the Act's legislative his-
tory as requiring more than the mere existence of state legislation applicable to
insurance activities. 257 They argue that the congressional debates over the pro-
posed bill, including clarifications offered by its sponsors, illustrate that the Act
requires effective and active regulation of the business of insurance by the
states.258 The state must supervise those functions essential to the insurance
business, such as the setting of premium rates. These critics assert that a state
statute which does not provide for supervision by a state agency fails to satisfy
this "regulation" requirement.
The courts, however, usually have not imposed such a stringent standard.
The Supreme Court first addressed this question in FTC v. National Casualty
Co. 2 5 9 Proceeding under section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC sought to prohibit
false, misleading, and deceptive advertising by certain insurance companies. Al-
abama's insurance regulatory scheme, which the FTC asserted was insufficient
to satisfy the McCarran-Ferguson language, provided for enforcement of its stat-
ute by the State Insurance Commission. The FTC contended that since the In-
surance Commission never had used its enforcement power, the Alabama statute
failed to satisfy the "regulated by State law" requirement. 260
In rejecting these arguments and concluding that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act barred the FTC's orders, the Supreme Court concluded that these activities
or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance:
Provided, That after June 30, 1948,. . . the Sherman Act,. . . the Clayton Act, and...
the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
255. All but one American jurisdiction (Guam) has some type of antitrust legislation. Weller,
To Preempt or Accommodate: The Question of State and Federal Antitrust Laws Under the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act, 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 421, 423 (1978). All jurisdictions except Ohio, the District of
Columbia, and Guam also have enacted unfair trade practices legislation. Id. at 441.
256. See supra note 254.
257. See, e.g., Dineen, The Rating Problem, 1946 A.B.A. SEC. INs. LAW 11; Kimball & Boyce,
supra note 16, at 570-575; Weller, supra note 24, at 607-14; Weller, supra note 255; Comment, State
Regulation Under the McCarran Act, 47 TUL. L. REv. 1069 (1973); Note, State Supervision Over
Insurance Rate-Making Combinations Under the McCarran Act, 60 YALE L.J. 160 (1951).
258. Most of these commentators have relied principally upon the Senate discussions preceding
the passage of Senate bill 340. See 91 CONG. REC. 1442-4, 1479-88 (1945).
259. 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
260. Id. at 564.
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were regulated sufficiently by the state to meet the statutory standard. The
Court noted that "[e]ach State in question has enacted prohibiting legislation
which proscribes unfair insurance advertising and authorizes enforcement
through a scheme of administrative supervision.
26 1
The FTC attempted to distinguish between the mere existence of state legis-
lation and the regulation assertedly required to satisfy McCarran-Ferguson, con-
tending that the fact that a state had enacted legislation prohibiting the conduct
in question was not enough. Rather, the FTC argued that the exemption was
not available until the state's prohibition of the insurance company's conduct
"has been crystallized into 'administrative elaboration of these standards and
application in individual cases.' "262 Rejecting this position, the Supreme Court
concluded that "assuming there is some difference in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act between 'legislation' and 'regulation,' nothing in the language of that Act or
its legislative history supports the distinctions drawn by [the FTC]. 2 63 The
Court concluded that a general prohibitory regulatory scheme would be ade-
quate to invoke the insurance exemption. 2
64
Although this approach may be overly deferential to the states and unduly
permissive of insurance activities, the majority of subsequent lower court cases
actually have taken an even more liberal approach to this requirement of state
regulation. Two of the earlier decisions illustrate the generally applicable
standard.
In California League of Independent Insurance Producers v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. 265 plaintiffs alleged that defendant insurance companies had con-
spired to decrease commission rates paid to insurance agents. Defendants re-
sponded that two state statutes regulated their activities; therefore, the alleged
conspiracy was immune from federal antitrust challenge. The first statute was a
part of the state insurance code; it "authorize[d] cooperation between insurers
in rate making and other related matters. '266 The second statute was the state's
general antitrust statute, which had been held by the state supreme court to be
applicable to insurance companies. 267 The court declined to require either any
finding that the state in fact had regulated the challenged activity or even that
the statutes referred specifically to the conduct under scrutiny. Rather, the
court dismissed the complaint, concluding that "if a State has generally author-
ized or permitted standards of conduct, it is regulating the business of insurance
261. Id. The state regulatory schemes in question were versions of the Model Unfair Practices
Bill for Insurance. Id. at 564 n.5.
262. Id. at 564.
263. Id. at 565.
264. The Court observed that the FTC "does not argue that the statutory provisions here under
review were mere pretense." Id. at 564. This statement would seem to suggest that if the state
enacted a law merely to exempt insurers from federal scrutiny, but with no intention of implement-
ing or enforcing that law, such a "sham" would not suffice to meet the § 2(b) standard. What is left
unclear is how plaintiffs might prove such a "pretense" and whether any minimal state regulation
other than mere "pretense" satisfies the statute.
265. 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
266. Id. at 860.
267. Id.
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under the McCarran Act."2 68
In Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Board 269 plaintiffs, labor unions and
purchasers of automobile liability insurance, alleged that defendant Insurance
Rating Board, which was composed of over one hundred insurance companies,
had conspired to fix premium rates for automobile casualty insurance. These
premium rates did not require prior approval by the Ohio Department of Insur-
ance; rather, they became effective immediately upon proposal by the Board.
Plaintiffs argued that since the Department of Insurance never had challenged
the rate increases, 270 the state of Ohio did not "regulate" the business of insur-
ance and therefore this conduct was subject to federal antitrust scrutiny. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, found that the
existence of Ohio's regulatory scheme was sufficient to invoke the McCarran-
Ferguson exemption. Because there was a specific state statute providing for the
regulation of rating organizations such as defendant and for the filing of its
members' rates, the court applied the same standard used in California League,
requiring only a general regulatory scheme governing the insurance activity.
That the statute actually was not enforced was insignificant;27 t that the system
was in place was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of regulation.
272
"[T]here is nothing in the language of the McCarran Act or in its legislative
history to support the thesis that the Act does not apply when the state's scheme
of regulation has not been effectively enforced."
27 3
Most lower court decisions after California League and Ohio AFL-CIO
have construed the requirement of state regulation equally liberally, both rela-
tive to the need for actual enforcement of the law by the state and to the regula-
268. Id. The court offered a number of formulations of this liberal approach. "[A] state regu-
lates the business of insurance . . . when a State statute generally proscribes . . . or permits or
authorizes certain conduct on the part of the insurance companies." Id. "[Section 2(b)] precludes a
Sherman Act suit if the charges alleged in the complaint are covered by [the] State [antitrust] act."
Id.
269. 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972).
270. Plaintiff alleged that the Department of Insurance did not even employ an actuary, who
would have been able to examine the rate filings. They therefore asserted that the "state has abdi-
cated its function of regulating the automobile insurance industry in favor of regulation by the...
industry itself." Id. at 1190.
271. "We find no support for the [plaintiff's] argument that the court in this case should inquire
into the question as to whether the statutes of Ohio have been effectively enforced in accordance with
their terms." Id. at 1184.
272. "[C]oncededly [Ohio's] scheme might not be as extensive or as stringent as some of the
other states." Id. at 1181.
273. Id. at 1184. The court seemed to place an almost impossible burden on plaintiffs of showing
an absence of regulation. The allegations that rate increases never had been challenged or that the
Department never had employed an actuary were dismissed since "[t]hese statements do not neces-
sarily establish a policy of non-enforcement in Ohio and certainly are insufficient to show that the
regulation of insurance in that state is a mere 'sham' or 'pretense.'" Id.
Dissenting from the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari, Justice Douglas argued:
A governmental regulatory agency which, in contradiction of a statutory direction,
only rarely exercises its examinatory powers; which has never exercised its powers or re-
view of rate increases; and which does not even employ the personnel which would be
necessary to exercise the power would prima facie seem to be not more than a "mere
pretense" of regulation.
Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Board, 409 U.S. 917, 918 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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tion of the particular conduct in question. 274 The existence of a statutory
scheme, even if it is not enforced or implemented, continues to suffice. Further-
more, the state regulatory scheme need not be directed specifically at the insur-
ance industry. Rather, a state's general antitrust statute usually will qualify as
"state regulation" for McCarran-Ferguson purposes.275 Although in a number
of decisions the courts did find state regulation of the specific activity at issue
before granting a McCarran-Ferguson exemption, 276 these findings probably
were unnecessary to the holdings 2 7 7 that the defendant insurers' business was
regulated by state law.2 7
8
274. See Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419, 421 (4th Cir. 1984); Seasongood v. K &
K Ins. Agency, 548 F.2d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 1977); Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 527
F.2d 233, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1975); Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725, 728 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins.
Co., 477 F.2d 77, 83-84 (10th Cir. 1973); First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 541
F. Supp. 1147, 1154 & n.8 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 714 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 709 (1984); Lawyer's Realty Corp. v. Peninsular Title Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (E.D.
La. 1977); Manasen v. California Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp 657, 667-69 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'dper
curiam, 638 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1979); Harrison v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,321 (D. Kan. 1974); Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,320
(N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 518 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1975); Steingart v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc'y, 366 F. Supp. 790, 792-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
275. See Lawyers Title Co. v. St. Paul Title Ins. Corp., 526 F.2d 795, 797-98 (8th Cir. 1975);
Meicler v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1975) (state antitrust statute
specifically prohibited concerted action to fix cost of insurance); Manasen v. California Dental
Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657, 669 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ("There is ample support for the proposition that a
state antitrust law constitutes sufficient state regulation within the meaning of the McCarran Act."),
rev'dper curiam, 638 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1979); Winters v. Kansas Hosp. Serv. Ass'n, 1975-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1 60,140 (D. Kan. 1975) (defendant's acts, covered by state antitrust law and insurance
code, were "regulated" by state law); Mitgang v. Western Title Ins. Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,322 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (state antitrust statute and unfair trade practices act sufficient); Steingart v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y, 366 F. Supp. 790, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("On [the basis of the state
antitrust law] alone, the McCarran exemption should operate as a bar to plaintiffs' federal antitrust
claims."); Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274, 278-80
(D. Mont. 1958).
276. See Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276,
1287 & n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 88 (1983); Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654
F.2d 218, 226 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 527 F.2d 233, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1975); Meicler v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732, 734
(5th Cir. 1975); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 83-84 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1093 (1973); Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77, 83 (10th Cir.
1973); Gribbin v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,798 (W.D.
La. 1984); Custom Auto Body, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,629 (D.R.I. 1983); Grant v. Erie Ins. Exch., 542 F. Supp. 457, 463-64 (M.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd
mem., 716 F.2d 890 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 349 (1983); Steinberg v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co., 486 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Steingart v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 366 F. Supp.
790, 793-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("pervasive scheme of legislation and ... antitrust law which pros-
cribes the very conduct alleged in the complaint"); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F.
Supp. 299, 301-02 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828
(1957).
277. See, e.g., In re Workers' Compensation Ins. Antitrust Litig., 574 F. Supp. 525, 531-33 (D.
Minn. 1983) (If a specific prohibition were required, "the exemption would not apply unless the state
regulation prohibited all activity which, absent the McCarran Act, would violate the antitrust laws
... . [Therefore,] [t]his court need only determine whether Minnesota has a general scheme for
regulating insurance."); Hopping v. Standard Life. Ins. Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,814 at
67,412 (N.D. Miss. 1983) ("The Supreme Court, Fifth Circuit, and numerous other courts have held
that the 'state regulation' requirement is fully satisfied if there is a pervasive general control of the
insurance industry by the state.").
278. But see United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d 428, 452-54 (9th Cir. 1981) (state
insurance codes prohibited interlocking directorates between two insurers, but not between insurer
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A few courts, however, have agreed with the commentators 279 who ques-
tion the many decisions holding the McCarran-Ferguson Act not to require even
a minimal level of effective state regulation before the exemption may be applied.
As one case noted, "the Act was never intended to preempt federal antitrust
laws in the face of superficial, ineffective state regulation. '280
These minority decisions are correct in their interpretation both of the lan-
guage of the Act and of its legislative history. Although the 1945 Congress in-
tended to restore state regulation of the insurance industry, it did not intend for
the mere existence of a statutory regime of perhaps limited application to insur-
ers, and in any event only minimally enforced, would displace the strong policies
of vigorous antitrust enforcement.2 8 1 Federal regulation would be unnecessary
and thus preemption would be acceptable only when the states truly were at-
tempting to protect competitors and competition. As another court recog-
nized,282 however, these minority decisions fly in the face of National
Casualty.2 83 Although it certainly would be proper for lower courts to give that
decision a limited rather than an expansive reading, a change in the basic re-
quirement of only minimal state regulation will require the Supreme Court to
reject its earlier approach.284 Such a shift by the Court would be a healthy
and commercial bank; challenge under Clayton Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982), to later interlocks
not preempted by McCarran-Ferguson), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bankamerica Corp. v.
United States, 103 S. Ct. 2266 (1983).
279. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
280. Escrow Disbursement Ins. Agency v. American Title Ins. Co., 550 F. Supp. 1192, 1198
(S.D. Fla. 1982) (emphasis omitted); see also Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218, 246
(3d Cir.) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) ("With regard to the nature of state regulation which satisfies the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, more affirmative regulation than a mere general prohibition of unfair trade
practices may be required."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Crawford v. American Title Ins,
Co., 518 F.2d 217, 221 (5th Cir. 1975) (Godbold, J., dissenting) ("In my view, a court faced with the
issue of whether a claim of a § 2(b) exemption is well founded must consider not merely whether the
state is regulating but whether it is doing so adequately."); United States v. Chicago Title & Trust
Co., 242 F. Supp. 56, 70-72 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (although Illinois had a statute regulating title insur-
ance, it did not deal with acquisitions of insurance companies; application of Clayton Act § 7 not
preempted); cf Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 819-21 (4th Cir. 1979)
(Hall, J., dissenting) (court must determine that state regulation exists; mere concession of this issue
by plaintiff insufficient), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980).
281. Extensive descriptions of this legislative history, including excerpts from the congressional
debates, are found in Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217, 220-36 (5th Cir. 1975)
(Godbold, J., dissenting).
282. Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,128 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
("Were the Court writing on a clean slate, it would be persuaded that the [state regulation here is
inadequate]. However, there is a strong Congressional policy favoring state regulation of the busi-
ness of insurance. There are no reported cases holding that a particular state does not regulate the
business of insurance.").
283. FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
284. In a subsequent decision, FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 298 n.4 (1960), the
Court noted that National Casualty left open at least two issues: whether general state legislation
would be preclusive if it did "not purport to apply to misrepresentations mailed to. . . residents by
unlicensed, nonresident insurance companies having no local agents"; and whether, even if the stat-
utes did purport to cover that conduct, they could be preclusive if state law "could not be effectively
enforced" against the out-of-state insurers.
There is some suggestion that the Court may impose more demanding standards of state regula.
tion in the future. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 554-55 (1978), the
Court noted that "petitioners do not aver that state law or regulatory policy can be said to have
required or authorized the concerted refusal to deal. . .. [O]ur decision (does not] address insur-
ance practices that are compelled or specifically authorized by state regulatory policy." It has been
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development.
2. Extraterritorial Application of State Regulation
Although an insurance company's conduct may be regulated by State A,
those activities also may take place in, or at least have an effect on competition
in, State B. The extent to which the regulation of an insurer's activities by one
state will confer McCarran-Ferguson immunity to conduct in another state
raises the question of extraterritoriality.
In FTC v. Travelers Health Association2 85 the Supreme Court held that the
regulation by one state of an insurance company's activities cannot be used to
create McCarran-Ferguson immunity for its activities outside the state. The
FTC had sought to prohibit an insurance company from making certain state-
ments and representations in letters sent to prospective policyholders in every
state, asserting that these claims were misleading and deceptive in violation of
section 5 of the FTC Act.28 6 The state of Nebraska, in which defendant was
incorporated, had a statute prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts and practices in
the conduct of the business of insurance" both within the state and "in the con-
duct of insurance in any other state." 287 The company asserted, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed,28 8 that its business was
sufficiently "regulated by State Law" 289 under this Nebraska statute to justify
immunity under section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The Supreme Court rejected this view, concluding that the FTC Act ap-
plied to these interstate mailings. 290 Although Nebraska law could immunize
approaches to persons within the state, the Court held that:
we cannot believe that this kind of law of a single State takes from the
residents of every other State the protection of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. In our opinion the state regulation which Congress pro-
vided should operate to displace this federal law means regulation by
the State in which the deception is practiced and has its impact.
29 1
inferred that such levels of policy--compulsion or specific authorization-now are required to satisfy
McCarran-Ferguson. See, e.g., Weller, The "New" McCarran-Ferguson Act Antitrust Exemption Af-
ter Barry, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 29 (1983).
285. 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
286. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
287. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-1503 (Cum. Supp. 1957), repealed by 1973 Neb. Laws 907, 918,
quoted in Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. at 295-96.
The Court did not discuss whether the deceptive and misleading mailings were the "business of
insurance," since two years earlier, in FIC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958), it had
held that advertising by insurance companies, even if deceptive, is part of that "business."
288. 262 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
289. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982).
290. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. at 298-99.
291. Id. In State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962), the Supreme Court
applied similar reasoning with regard to a state's taxation of out-of-state insurance activities. The
state of Texas attempted to tax insurance premiums paid outside the state to insurance companies
doing business outside the state; the only connection to Texas was that the insured property was
located within the state. Holding this taxation beyond the state's power, the Supreme Court held
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not confer any greater power on the states to tax these transac-
tions outside their boundaries than they had prior to the passage of the Act.
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The Court's conclusion is buttressed by various policy considerations.
First, the purpose of McCarran-Ferguson was to restore the level of state regula-
tion to the status prevailing prior to South-Eastern Underwriters.292 The Con-
gress, however, had no intention to allow a state to regulate not only activites
within its borders, but also insurance company activities in other states. 293
Second, adoption of the court of appeals' view would have permitted one
state to determine the level of protection from insurance company activities to
be enjoyed by the citizens of all states.294 If the laws of the state of incorpora-
tion or regulation were permissive, insurance companies located there could fix
prices, exclude competition, or engage in certain deceptive practices regardless
of the level of protection other states intended to afford these activities. Thus, a
contrary ruling might have led to calls for complete repeal or substantial amend-
ment of McCarran-Ferguson to ensure some level of protection to citizens of
those other states.
The McCarran-Ferguson exemption applies, then, only if the various states
in which the complained-of activity "is practiced and has its impact" 295 do in-
deed "regulate" that activity. If there is such a regulation in some states but not
in others, the immunity will be afforded only in the former jurisdictions; 296 fed-
eral law still will apply in the latter states. The thrust of subsequent decisions
has been to identify those states in which the insurer's activity does have an
effect and determine whether those states have mechanisms for regulating the
conduct. 297
This approach is not without its difficulties. If an insurance company oper-
ates nationally with policyholders, stockholders, and agents in every state, and if
the impact of its allegedly anticompetitive activity might extend to every state, a
court would be obligated to examine whether the law of each of those states
purports to regulate that particular conduct. Although situations might arise in
which the contacts with any particular state are so substantial that the state's
regulation of an activity will result in broad federal preemption-perhaps if both
the plaintiff and the defendant reside in the state and if the primary effect of the
292. See generally supra notes 24-50 and accompanying text (discussing history and purpose of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
293. "There was no indication of any thought that a state could regulate activities carried on
beyond its own borders." Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. at 300.
294. One of the major arguments advanced by proponents of leaving regulation to the States
was that the States were in close proximity to the people affected by the insurance business
and, therefore, were in a better position to regulate that business than the Federal Govern-
ment. . . . Such a purpose would hardly be served by delegating to any one State sole
legislative and administrative control of the practices of an insurance business affecting the
residents of every other State in the Union.
Id. at 302.
295. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
296. For example, on remand in Travelers Health Ass'n, the court of appeals enjoined the FTC
from further proceedings only with respect to the two states that had regulated respondent's activi-
ties, Travelers Health Ass'n v. FTC, 298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962).
297. See Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 548 F.2d 729, 735-39 (8th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1965); In re Aviation Ins. Indus., 183 F.
Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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activity occurs there29 8-normally such regulation would not be enough.
"Travelers Health . . . makes clear that a state regulatory scheme operating es-
sentially extraterritorially is not the kind of regulation contemplated by McCar-
ran-Ferguson." 299
In summary, the Supreme Court's two decisions in this area, National Cas-
ualty and Travelers Health Association, yield a tenuous balance. The former case
holds that minimal state regulation is sufficient to satisfy section 2(b); the latter
holds that each state in which an effect is felt must have at least that minimal
level of supervision of the conduct. It would make more sense to require more
substantial and effective state regulation of the otherwise displaced federal con-
trol, but then to find that this state supervision--especially in that state where
the activity originates or predominates-could be sufficient to preempt federal
intervention even with respect to activities in other, less substantially affected
jurisdictions. Supreme Court reexamination of this area is overdue.
C. Inapplicability of Act to Boycott, Coercion, and Intimidation
Section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act imposes a third requirement
for the successful invocation of the exemption for insurance company activities:
The conduct, having been determined to involve the "business of insurance" and
to be sufficiently regulated by state law, also must be found not to constitute an
"agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or in-
timidation. ' ' 3° ° In assessing the scope of this boycott limitation to the McCar-
ran-Ferguson exemption, three issues must be considered: (1) Who may assert
the boycott exclusion? (2) What types of conduct trigger its application? and (3)
To what extent should the legality of the underlying conduct, including its pur-
pose and effect, be considered in deciding whether the conduct falls within sec-
tion 3(b)?
1. Persons Affected by Boycott
The boycott exception was added to the Act "as an important safeguard
against the danger that insurance companies might take advantage of purely
permissive state legislation to establish monopolies and enter into restrictive
agreements falling outside the realm of state-supervised cooperative action. 3
0 1
In making "boycott" actions beyond the scope of section 2(b), however, the Act
left unclear whether the exception applied only to boycotts of persons within the
insurance industry or whether it also might apply to boycotts of those outside
the industry.30 2
298. See Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 548 F.2d 729, 738 (8th Cir. 1977).
299. Id. at 738-39.
300. Section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides: "Nothing contained in this chapter
shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or
act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation." 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1982) (emphasis added). See gener-
ally Annot., 52 A.L.R. FED. 255 (1981) (discussing what constitutes boycott, coercion, or intimida-
tion for purposes of § 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
301. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 533 (1978).
302. Although there is some imprecision in the statute, it is clear that § 3(b) permits both private
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Prior to 1978 the lower courts disagreed about the range of persons who
would fall within the section 3(b) limitation if made the subject of a boycott.
Some cases held that only boycotts of other insurance companies or of insurance
agents (persons within the industry) were excluded from McCarran-Ferguson
immunity. 30 3 Other decisions extended the exception further.3°4 In St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry 305 the Supreme Court supported this
broader interpretation, holding that section 3(b) made the Sherman Act applica-
ble to a boycott directed against policyholders as well as one against industry
members. 306
In the early 1970s only four companies sold medical malpractice insurance
in the state of Rhode Island. In an effort allegedly designed to reduce risks,
costs, and premiums, the largest insurer, St. Paul, announced that it would not
renew such insurance coverage on an "occurrence" basis, but would write insur-
ance only on a "claims made" basis.307 Pursuant to an agreement between the
four insurers, the other three companies refused to accept applications for any
type of malpractice insurance. As a result, all health care providers had to
purchase insurance from St. Paul on the terms announced by that company. 30 8
The trial court had dismissed a class action brought by a number of physi-
treble damage actions and suits by the government for insurance company "boycotts." Monarch
Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
952 (1964).
303. See, e.g., Meicler v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1975); Addrisi
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929
(1975); Manasen v. California Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657, 662 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd per
curiam, 638 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1979); Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 61,128 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Pierucci v. Continental Casualty Co., 418 F. Supp. 704, 708(W.D. Pa. 1976); McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Frank-
ford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977); Mathis v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 410 F. Supp.
1037, 1041 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Pastor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,783
(C.D. Cal. 1976); Mitgang v. Western Title Ins. Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,322 (N.D. Cal,
1974); Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12, 26 (D. Or. 1966).
304. See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), va-
cated, 440 U.S. 942 (1979); Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977),
aff'd, 438 U.S. 531 (1978); Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075, 1078 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 922 (1977); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 846 (2d
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964); General Glass Co. v. Globe Glass & Trim Co., 1978-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,998 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
305. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
306. Id. at 550.
307. "An 'occurrence' policy protects the policyholder from liability for any act done while the
policy is in effect, whereas a 'claims made' policy protects the holder only against claims made
during the life of the policy." Id. at 535 n.3.
308. Solely for the purpose of forcing physicians and hospitals to accede to a substantial
curtailment of the coverage previously available, St. Paul induced its competitors to refuse
to deal on any terms with its customers. This agreement did not simply fix rates or terms
of coverage; it effectively barred St. Paul's policyholders from all access to alternative
sources of coverage and even from negotiating for more favorable terms elsewhere in the
market. The pact served as a tactical weapon invoked by St. Paul in support of a dispute
with its policyholders.
The enlistment of third parties in an agreement not to trade, as a means of compelling
capitulation by the boycotted group, long has been viewed as conduct supporting a finding
of unlawful boycott.
Id. at 544-45.
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cians who were policyholders of St. Paul and their patients, concluding that the
McCarran-Ferguson exemption applied30 9 because" 'the purpose of the boycott,
coercion, and intimidation exception was solely to protect insurance agents or
other insurance companies from being 'black-listed' by powerful combinations of
insurance companies, not to affect the insurer-insured relationship.' ",310 Re-
jecting this approach, the Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit's reversal of that ruling. Reviewing both the legis-
lative history of McCarran-Ferguson and the judicial treatment of group boy-
cotts or concerted refusals to deal, the Court broadly defined a "boycott" as "a
method of pressuring a party with whom one has a dispute by withholding, or
enlisting others to withhold, patronage or services from the target. 311 There-
fore, it was inappropriate to limit that term, as used in section 3(b) of McCarran-
Ferguson, only to refusals to deal with competitors or with members of the same
industry. 312
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court gave little guidance on the treatment of
other entities in future situations. Although policyholders now are identified as
within the protected class, the Court articulated no test other than the broad
definition of "boycott" for identifying others in that category. In fact, since
Barry there has been little case law dealing with the range of other persons who,
if made the subject of concerted nondealing, will be deemed to have been boy-
cotted under section 3(b). 3 13 One lower court, however, has construed Barry to
apply to a concerted refusal to deal with service providers,314 and thus to treat
that conduct also as outside the ambit of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption.
Although the Court's decision was somewhat imprecise both on the ration-
ale for the boycott exception and on the standard to measure its future applica-
tion, the actual result reached in Barry is desirable. McCarran-Ferguson was
designed to permit certain forms of collaboration by insurance companies and to
restore state regulation of those activities; that immunized conduct, however,
was principally rate-setting, data collection and dissemination, establishment of
common industry standards, and the like. The Act was not designed to allow
insurers to use their common market power to coerce others or to prevent others
from enjoying the benefits of competition in the industry. The elimination of
federal antitrust scrutiny, coupled with enhanced state regulation, was counte-
nanced only to the extent necessary to protect both the insureds and the stability
309. Plaintiffs conceded that defendants' acts were related to the "business of insuranea" and
that Rhode Island effectively regulated that business. Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555
F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
310. Barry, 438 U.S. at 536 (quoting district court order).
311. Id. at 541.
312. "We hold that the term 'boycott' is not limited to concerted activity against insurance com-
panies or agents or, more generally, against competitors of members of the boycotting group." Id. at
552.
313. Since Barry several courts have reaffirmed the applicability of § 3(b) to the alleged boycott
of policyholders. See, e.g., Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv., 701 F.2d
1276 (9th Cir.) (on merits, conduct did not amount to boycott), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 88 (1983);
Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 469 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Va. 1979), modi-
fied on other grounds, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
314. See Workman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 520 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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of insurers. Concerted refusals to deal with others, whether inside or outside the
industry, are neither necessary for the success of the insurance industry nor
something that the states might regulate adequately. Thus, full antitrust scru-
tiny of that conduct on the same basis as in any other industry seems
desirable. 315
2. Prohibited Conduct
If the Supreme Court in Barry was unclear which persons might be subject
to a "boycott" under section 3(b), it was even less clear on what underlying
conduct constituted a "boycott" for purposes of that exclusion. On one point,
however, the Court was specific: Section 3(b) only refers to a "group boy-
cott"; the refusal of an individual insurer, acting alone, to deal with another is
not a "boycott" under this section. 316 On the other hand, the Court was not
clear whether a "boycott" was only a simple and absolute refusal to deal or
whether it also included conditional or partial refusals to deal.317 In addition,
the Court left open the possibility that a defendant's purpose and the effect on
competition of the refusal to deal would be relevant in characterizing conduct as
a "boycott" under section 3(b). 3 18
Barry actually offered a variety of definitions for a "boycott." The conduct
was said to consist of the following: "'concerted refusals by traders to deal with
other traders' ,,;319 "combinations of businessmen 'to deprive others of access to
merchandise which the latter wish to sell to the public' -1;320 and a "'concerted
refusal to deal' with a disfavored purchaser or seller."' 321 Recognizing this mul-
315. See supra notes 4-21 and accompanying text.
316. "[C]onduct by individual actors falling short of concerted activity is simply not a 'boycott'
within § 3(b)." Barry, 438 U.S. at 555; see also Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath
Medical Serv., 701 F.2d 1276, 1291 (9th Cir.) (on merits, conduct did not amount to a boycott), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 88 (1983); Anglin v. Blue Shield, 693 F.2d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 1982) (decisions by
local insurance organizations not to offer the coverage desired by plaintiff constituted individual
actions rather than a "boycott"); Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1206
(7th Cir. 1981) (no boycott without proof of "concerted action"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982);
Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218, 232 (3d Cir.) (concert of action remains a "sine
qua non" of a boycott allegation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Hopping v. Standard Life Ins.
Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,814 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (termination of agent by insurance com-
pany for violation of exclusive agency provisions, covenants not to compete, or nonsolicitation agree-
ments is not a "boycott"); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 549 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982) (to state a claim within boycott exception to McCarran-Ferguson Act, complaint must
allege sufficient concerted action by defendants); Workman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 520
F. Supp. 610, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("ITihe lynchpin of an actionable group boycott under the
antitrust laws is concerted action."). Whether there is concerted or only individual action is a ques-
tion of fact. See, e.g., Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828, 832-34 (10th Cir. 1979) (no
conspiracy existed between an association of general agents of an insurance company and the insur-
ance company itself); Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 564, 571 (D. Minn. 1981) (corpo.
ration consisting of dentists participating in payment-insurance plan could act in concert with
member dentists; such an arrangement is not precluded from boycott exception as a matter of law).
317. See infra notes 319-45 and accompanying text.
318. See infra notes 347-54 and accompanying text.
319. Barry, 438 U.S. at 543 (quoting Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212
(1959)).
320. Id. (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966)).
321. Id. at 536 (quoting Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 7 (Ist Cir. 1977), aff'd,
438 U.S. 531 (1978)).
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tiplicity of definitions, 322 the Court conceded that " 'boycotts are not a unitary
phenomenon.' "323
The facts in Barry, however, offered a clear illustration of an absolute boy-
cott.324 Prior to the alleged conspiracy, four insurance companies each offered a
variety of malpractice policies. After the agreement went into effect, one com-
pany insisted on offering only one kind of policy and the other three refused to
offer any policies to plaintiffs. The agreement undeniably created coercion to
accept a certain product only from a certain seller, and was coupled with an
absolute refusal by others to deal. The Court rejected the defendants' argument
that conduct should not be deemed a "boycott" unless it was "inherently de-
structive of competition. ' 325  Although this particular refusal might not be
treated under the per se rule applicable generally to group boycotts under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, it clearly was a "boycott" under McCarran-Ferguson
section 3(b). 3 2 6
Other cases, however, have been less obvious than Barry. Boycotts most
frequently have been found in agreements between insurance companies or be-
tween an insurer and a provider aimed either at coercing other providers to
conform to certain conduct 327 or at deterring the insureds from using those non-
conforming providers. 328 In these cases in which the insureds remained free to
choose their own providers and in which there was no actual duress or coercion
by the insurers, however, there was no boycott even though use by the insureds
of the disfavored providers became more expensive or more difficult.329 Most
322. See also supra note 311 and accompanying text (yet another definition of a "boycott" by
Barry Court).
323. Barry, 438 U.S. at 543 (quoting P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 381 (2d ed. 1974)).
324. Plaintiffs in Barry had characterized the restraint as a " 'traditional boycott,' defined as a
concerted refusal to deal on any terms, as opposed to a refusal to deal except on specified terms." Id.
at 540.
325. Id. at 542.
326. [Defendants) cite commentary that attempts to develop a test for distinguishing the
types of restraints that warrant per se invalidation from other concerted refusals to deal
that are not inherently destructive of competition. But the issue before us is whether the
conduct in question involves a boycott, not whether it is per se unreasonable.
Id. See generally Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemp-
tions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 UCLA L. REV. 265, 276-78 (1979)
(distinguishing per se and McCarran-Ferguson boycotts).
327. See Trident Neuro-Imaging Lab. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 568 F. Supp. 1474, 1479
(D.S.C. 1983); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 549 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (M.D. Tenn. 1982);
Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 564, 572 (D. Minn. 1981); see also Battle v. Liberty
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39, 51 (5th Cir. 1974) (threat to provider to induce continuation of
provider agreement), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 110 (1975).
328. See Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 484 (4th Cir.
1980) (insurer's policy requiring psychologists to submit bills through physicians, rather than di-
rectly), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262,
275 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (agreement using certain high-rate providers), vacated, 440 U.S. 942 (1979);
Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075, 1078 (4th Cir. 1976) (agreement between insurers and certain
kinds of health providers that insurers would not provide coverage for certain other kinds of provid-
ers), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977).
329. See Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276,
1287-88, 1290-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 88 (1983); Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiroprac-
tors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980). The Bartholomew
decision predates Pireno, see supra notes 137-53 and accompanying text. In Bartholomew the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that peer review committees were part of
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refusals by insurance companies to deal with an agent have not been regarded as
"boycotts," even though agents were within the protected class even before
Barry.330 A substantial number of cases hold that the termination of an agent
for failure to adhere to an exclusive agency contract 33t1 -or the insurer's failure
to renew the agency agreement-is not within section 3(b). 3 3 2 Similarly, an
agreement between two insurers to divide the market, whereupon one company
exits the market and its former agent is denied the right to represent the surviv-
ing insurer, is not a "concerted refusal to deal" with that agent by the two insur-
ers;3 3 3 an agreement between two insurers only to offer certain kinds of policies
so that a prospective policyholder either had to take more extensive coverage or
no coverage at all was held not to be a "boycott" when other existing insurers
the "business of insurance" and further held that their use did not constitute a boycott, even though
they made it less likely that policyholders would employ the services of certain providers. To the
extent Pireno rejects this first holding, it also might implicitly cast some doubt on the second hold-
ing.
See also Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1206 (7th Cir. 1981)
(defendant's unwillingness to pay more than competitive price is not a boycott), cert denied, 455
U.S. 1020 (1982); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(boycott of shops that refused to abide by prevailing labor rules), vacated, 440 U.S. 942 (1979);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir.) (offering economic inducements to hospi-
tals not "coercion"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); Custom Auto Body, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,629 (D.R.I. 1983) (insurer's use of preferred repair shops
does not constitute a boycott). See generally Workman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins, Co., 520 F.
Supp. 610, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (great difficulty exists in trying to prove conspiracy between insurer
and insured to boycott provider).
330. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
331. The status of exclusive dealing agreements between insurers and agents as within the "busi-
ness of insurance" under § 2(b) of the Act is discussed supra notes 232-40 and accompanying text.
332. See Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828, 832-34 (10th Cir. 1979); Hopping v.
Standard Life Ins. Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) q 65,814 (N.D. Miss. 1983); Black v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 458, 461-62 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1978);
Blackley v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,061 (D. Utah 1976); see also
Blackburn v. Crum & Forster, 611 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir.) (concerted agreement between insurers
not to deal with agent, which would not be illegal under Sherman Act § 1, not "boycott" under
McCarran-Ferguson Act § 3(b)), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980). But see Ray v. Family Life Ins.
Co., 430 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (W.D.N.C. 1977) ("[D]efendant's threat to Ray that it would cut off
Ray's agency . . . constituted 'coercion' as that term is used in § 1013(b).").
These decisions have been explained on the ground that they involve neither coercion of a
"target" nor an intent to pressure others to adhere to certain conduct, but merely a choice by an
insurer of those with whom it will do business. See, e.g., Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d
828, 832-34 (10th Cir. 1979). This explanation oversimplifies the situation to the point of mis-
characterization. The insurer normally would prefer to continue the exclusive agency relationship,
but would like the agent to adhere to certain standards-exclusive representation of the insurer.
Furthermore, termination of the agent will send a message to others in the industry of the insurer's
"tough" policy regarding those who do not adhere to its exclusivity requirement. Thus, if the con-
duct is not to be treated as a "boycott," it would either be because the decision to terminate normally
is unilateral-the required plurality for Sherman Act § I purposes comes from the agreement itself,
between insurer and agent--or because exclusive dealing arrangements historically have been treated
under Clayton Act § 3 and analyzed under a rule of reason, rather than under the per se approach
applicable to most boycotts under Sherman Act § 1. The "boycott" under McCarran-Ferguson
§ 3(b) would extend only to Sherman Act, as opposed to Clayton Act, refusals to deal. It then
follows that the § 3(b) boycott provision certainly should apply if the termination of an agent for
failure to adhere to an exclusive agency contract is part of a broader agreement between the two
insurance companies.
333. Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218, 232 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981). But cf. Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 597 F.2d 1318,
1319 (10th Cir.) (conspiracy to drive independent insurance adjuster out of business would be "boy-
cott" under § 3(b)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979).
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offered alternate coverage;334 and a requirement that applicants for insurance
first join an organization as a prerequisite for eligibility for group or individual
coverage from an insurer is not a "boycott" or act of "coercion. ' 335 Finally, a
bare price-fixing agreement between insurers is not a "boycott," even though it
could be characterized as a refusal to deal other than on certain specified price
terms.336 There may be a "boycott," however, if the price-fixing is accompanied
by certain enforcement activities.
337
Some of the general characteristics of a section 3(b) "boycott" have been
discussed by the courts. In addition to the requirement of plurality of conduct
identified by Barry,338 there must be some element of duress or coercion. 339 The
mere exercise of choice by insurers of whom to insure or the kinds of coverage to
offer, with no intention of altering the conduct of others, is not a "boycott.
' 34 °
334. See Anglin v. Blue Shield, 693 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1982).
335. Feinstein v. Nettleship Co., 714 F.2d 928, 933-34 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2346 (1984). The court also rejected the suggestion that the necessary "coercion" to deal with de-
fendant existed because defendant was a monopolist and therefore the only insurer that offered that
type of coverage. The "boycott" or "coercion" exception was not made out by proof of monopoliza-
tion violative of Sherman Act § 2. Id. at 934-35.
336. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated,
440 U.S. 942 (1979); In re Worker's Compensation Ins. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 525, 533-35 (D. Minn.
1983). As the latter court noted, if price-fixing agreements were characterized as "boycotts" under
§ 3(b), the very heart of McCarran-Ferguson would be eviscerated. The principal purpose of the
statute was to reverse South-Eastern Underwriters and permit such joint rate-setting, subject to some
state regulation. Indeed, the court could have gone further; the logical implication of plaintiff's
reasoning-that any joint conduct might be characterized as a demand that others do business with
defendants only on the terms that resulted from their joint agreement, be it on price, quality, quan-
tity, territory, or something else-would have resulted in a "boycott" encompassing all joint activi-
ties. Very little conduct would be subject to the § 2(b) exemption. See also Grant v. Erie Ins. Exch.,
542 F. Supp. 457, 465 (M.D. Pa. 1982) ("(A]n agreement to fix terms of coverage is comparable to
an agreement to fix prices and, thus, does not constitute a boycott."), aff'd, 716 F.2d 890 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 349 (1983).
This potential for § 3(b) to swallow up § 2(b) was suggested by the dissent in Barry and rejected
by the majority opinion. Compare Barry, 438 U.S. at 559 n.6 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Most prac-
tices condemned by the Sherman Act can be cast as an act or agreement of 'boycott, coercion, or
intimidation.' For example, price fixing can be seen as either a refusal to deal except at a uniform
price (i.e., a boycott), or as an agreement to force buyers to accept an offer on the sellers' common
terms (i.e., coercion). Yet state-sanctioned price fixing immunized by § 2(b) was plainly not in-
tended to fall within the § 3(b) exception.") with Barry, 438 U.S. at 545 n.18 ("Whatever the precise
reach of the terms 'boycott,' 'coercion,' and 'intimidation,' the decisions of this Court do not support
the dissent's suggestion that they are coextensive with the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. In this
regard, we are not cited to any decision illustrating the assertion. . . that price fixing, in the absence
of any additional enforcement activity, has been treated as 'a boycott' or 'coercion.' "') (emphasis
added).
337. In re Workers' Compensation Ins. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 525, 533-35 (D. Minn. 1983). In-
deed, although this suggestion that additional enforcement activity might turn price fixing into a
§ 3(b) "boycott" is found in the Barry opinion, see supra note 336, allowing this opportunity would
open up the very real possibility of the exception swallowing the rule described in the Barry dissent
and thus should be eschewed. Congress in 1945 certainly knew the difference between price fixing
and a boycott; it is unlikely that even vigorous enforcement of rate-setting arrangements by insur-
ance companies-the very thing that § 2(b) was intended to immunize if regulated by state law-
would then have been subject to antitrust scrutiny because of a broad interpretation of § 3(b).
338. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
339. See Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828, 832-34 (10th Cir. 1979).
340. Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218, 233 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 431 F. Supp. 5, 10-11 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd per curiam,
557 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976).
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That the defendant-insurer's policyholders continue to do some, albeit dimin-
ished, business with the plaintiff-provider in the face of the complained-of con-
duct also is evidence of the absence of a "boycott. g34 1
On the other hand, the large majority of cases have held that an absolute
refusal to deal is not required to bring the conduct within section 3(b); a partial
or conditional refusal to deal, if it is designed to coerce the target to conform to
certain conduct, still will be deemed a "boycott. ' 342 Similarly, it is not neces-
sary that the boycott result in complete displacement of the plaintiff from the
market; partial success is sufficient.3 43 Finally, the insurers engaged in the al-
leged concerted refusal to deal need not be competitors of the target; it is enough
if there is a vertical relationship between the parties. 344
The definition of a "boycott" under section 3(b), then, should be at least as
broad as the scope of that term under the Sherman Act generally. Although it
should not reach every "refusal to deal" in its full semantic sense, it should
encompass concerted activities by competitors who use their joint market power
to coerce, discipline, or eliminate from the market other factors in the indus-
try.3 45 To the extent that such use of economic power may displace market
forces and enable competitors in the insurance industry to achieve through their
joint refusal to deal what they could not achieve acting separately, that conduct
cannot be shielded by McCarran-Ferguson, but should be subject to the full
scrutiny of the antitrust laws.
3. Legality of Underlying Conduct
Traditional rhetoric is that once conduct is characterized as a "group boy-
cott" or "concerted refusal to deal," it is unreasonable per se.34 6 In making this
341. See Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1206 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 276 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), vacated, 440 U.S. 942 (1979); Workman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 520 F. Supp.
610, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
342. See Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 484 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); In re Workers' Compensation Ins. Litig., 574 F. Supp, 525,
534 (D. Minn. 1983); Trident Neuro-Imaging Laboratory v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 568 F. Supp.
1474, 1479 (D.S.C. 1983); Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 564, 572 (D. Minn. 1981).
343. See Trident Neuro-Imaging Laboratory v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 568 F. Supp. 1474,
1479 (D.S.C. 1983); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 549 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (M.D. Tenn.
1982); Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 564, 572 (D. Minn. 1981).
344. See Barry, 438 U.S. at 543 ("[Tlhe boycotters and the ultimate target need not be in a
competitive relationship with each other."); Trident Neuro-Imaging Laboratory v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 568 F. Supp. 1474, 1479 (D.S.C. 1983); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbet, 549 F,
Supp. 1185, 1190 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); cf. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F.
Supp. 298, 309 n.18 (E.D. Va. 1977) (rules adopted by state bar association inhibiting issuance of
title insurance policies resulted in "boycott"; McCarran-Ferguson exemption unavailable to shield
association's conduct even if it affected the "business of insurance"), vacated, 571 F.2d 205 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 941 (1978). But see Hopping v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 1984-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,814 at 67,413 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (no "boycott" because conduct not "unreasonable
when defendant insurers were not competitors either of one another or with plaintiff agent"),
345. Cf. Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 326, at 279 ("Simply stated, the employment of substantial
unregulated economic power by insurance industry members should be considered 'boycott, coercion
or intimidation' for the Act's purposes.").
346. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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characterization, however, courts have had to look to the defendant's purpose or
intent in imposing the restraint and at the effect of the restraint on competi-
tion.34 7 More recent cases have concluded that the per se approach does not
apply to all group boycotts and that some such restraints might be tested di-
rectly under the rule of reason. 348 The Supreme Court in Barry contributed to
some of this confusion and uncertainty by suggesting that the per se approach to
group boycotts generally might be subject to reexamination. 349 The Court also
suggested that the test for a "boycott" under section 3(b) of McCarran-Ferguson
might be different from the test for those "group boycotts" found unreasonable
per se under prior Supreme Court decisions. 350
In evaluating the applicability of section 3(b) to the conduct of insurance
companies, the courts have differed on the significance of the legality of the un-
derlying conduct and on the elements that would be used in characterizing the
conduct. Several decisions have examined the alleged "boycott" to determine if
it would be unlawful; then, having concluded that the insurer was violating
neither the per se standard nor the rule of reason, these courts have held that the
conduct did not constitute a section 3(b) "boycott. ' 351 Other decisions have
looked at the indicia used to characterize conduct for Sherman Act section 1
purposes. Thus, a finding that the defendants intended to coerce or discipline
the target of the boycott or a finding that the refusal to deal had an adverse effect
on competition has been used to bring the conduct within section 3(b). 352
This approach initially appears to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
statement that the determination whether McCarran-Ferguson immunity exists
347. See generally 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 193, §§ 10.27-.38 (discussing cases that consider
the adverse effects on competition and intent factors of per se boycotts); Bauer, Per Se Illegality of
Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 685 (1979) (dis-
cussing cases that consider the effects of boycotts on competitors' existence and ability to compete).
348. See, e.g., Com-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmeri-
card, Inc., 485 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974). The Supreme Court
may reexamine the scope of the per se rule regarding group boycotts in Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
77 (1984).
349. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
350. Id. See generally Blue Cross v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,588
(W.D. Wash. 1981) (applying rule of reason approach to boycott by health care insurer); Coopera-
tiva de Seguros Multiples de Puerto Rico v. San Juan, 294 F. Supp. 627, 628-29 (D.P.R. 1968) (term
"boycott" not narrower than meaning of that term under Sherman Act).
351. See Blackburn v. Crum & Forster, 611 F.2d 102, 104-05 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
906 (1980); Hopping v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 65,814 (N.D. Miss.
1983).
352. See Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,302
(W.D. Pa. 1983) (look to anticompetitive effects to determine existence of "boycott"), rev'd on other
grounds, 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1984); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 549 F. Supp. 1185, 1190-
92 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (purpose of excluding competitor); Hoffmari v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F.
Supp. 564, 572 (D. Minn. 1981) (applying rule of reason to insurer's refusal to afford coverage to
plaintiff provider; look to purpose and effect of restriction); see also General Glass Co. v. Globe
Glass & Trim Co., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,231 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (rule of reason applied to
reasonableness of restraints); cf. Owens v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218, 233 (3d Cir.)
(fact that defendant's division of markets may have had effect of excluding plaintiff broker-agent
from market does not make conduct a § 3(b) "boycott"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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is a separate inquiry from the underlying merits of the antitrust claim.3 53 None-
theless, this merger of analysis is not only healthy, but often necessary for satis-
factory application of the section 3(b) limitation. Difficulties would arise if the
Court seriously meant that a McCarran-Ferguson "boycott" and a Sherman Act
"boycott" are different.3 54 The Court probably intended, however, that insur-
ance company refusals to deal not necessarily fall within the per se unreasonable
category, but rather sometimes be tested by the rule-of-reason approach. In
these latter situations, there could be some repetition of analysis if the courts
looked at purpose and effect to determine whether McCarran-Ferguson should
apply and then reexamined these factors to determine legality. In fact, courts
have collapsed the analysis.
If the Court ultimately will find no Sherman Act section 1 violation on the
merits, it would be pointless to characterize this conduct as a section 3(b) "boy-
cott." On the other hand, Congress, by adding section 3(b), intended to deny a
shield to the insurance industry in those situations in which the conduct points
to a substantive violation of the section 1 Sherman Act prohibition of concerted
refusals to deal. Substantial confusion, however, would be introduced if the
Court did apply different standards to the two "boycott" provisions. Such an
approach should be rejected.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF THE "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE
In a series of decisions beginning with Parker v. Brown,355 the Supreme
Court has held that certain state conduct or the authorization by a state of cer-
tain private conduct could preempt the application of the antitrust laws. This
principle, known as the state-action doctrine,35 6 may affect the McCarran-Fer-
guson exemption in two ways. First, both the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the
state-action doctrine require certain levels of state involvement before federal
law can be preempted. Second, Congress in 1945 arguably may have intended to
limit the state-action doctrine to foreclose the states from preempting section
3(b) of the Act. 357 Thus, notwithstanding the state-action doctrine, a state
could not authorize concerted refusals to deal by insurance companies, and such
refusals therefore would be examined under the antitrust laws.
It is unlikely that the state-action doctrine will confer any additional ex-
emption on insurance company activities if they otherwise are regulated insuffi-
ciently by state law to obtain immunity under section 2(b). The amount of state
involvement required by these two exemptive doctrines differs substantially. To
353. See supra note 84.
354. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
355. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
356. Although the terms "Parker doctrine" and "state action" doctrine or exemption often are
used interchangeably, the latter is somewhat broader than the former. In Parker, the Supreme Court
held that certain actions of the state itself--or, as indicated by subsequent decisions, its subdivisions,
municipalities, and the like-will be exempt from the antitrust laws. The state-action doctrine incor-
porates this immunity, but also extends it to certain private activities undertaken pursuant to state
command and supervision.
357. See supra notes 300-54 and accompanying text.
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invoke section 2(b), courts have required only a general state regulatory
scheme.3 58 On the other hand, for the state-action doctrine to apply, the con-
duct actually must be compelled and supervised by the state.359 Thus, it is diffi-
cult to imagine a situation in which the state-action requirement of state
compulsion would be satisfied, but that also would not meet the less demanding
"regulated by State law" standard of McCarran-Ferguson.3 60
The federal courts are split on the ability of a state to immunize a group
boycott-othenvise subject to antitrust scrutiny because of section 3(b)-pursu-
ant to the state-action doctrine. In Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
CO. 361 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that the
state-action defense may be asserted even if the challenged conduct amounts to
boycott, coercion, or intimidation.3 62 Although the court concluded that the
Parker doctrine did not apply because the state of Rhode Island had not actually
authorized defendants' conduct, the court stated in dictum that the state-action
doctrine was not affected by the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.363 In
358. See supra notes 254-99 and accompanying text.
359. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
The state-action defense was rejected because of an absence of state compulsion of supervision
in Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1267-68 (4th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Title
Ins. Rating Bureau, 700 F.2d 1247, 1252-53 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984);
Ballard v. Blue Shield, 529 F. Supp. 71, 76 (S.D.W. Va. 1981).
360. See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir.) (state regulation of
insurance through rating bureaus not foreclosed by the McCarran Act's application of federal anti-
trust laws to insurance companies), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
361. 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
362. Id. at 8.
363. "The boycott provision merely neutralizes [the McCarran-Ferguson] Act, leaving intact the
doctrine of Parker v. Brown . . . which today insulates state regulatory schemes outside the insur-
ance context from antitrust liability." Id.
On review, the Supreme Court expressly declined to consider this issue:
We have no occasion here to decide whether the element of state regulatory direction or
authorization of the particular practice, absent in this case, is a factor to be considered in
the definition of "boycott" within the meaning of § 3(b), or whether it comes into play as
part of a possible defense under the "state action" doctrine ....
Barry, 438 U.S. at 554 n.27.
The Court's opinion, however, at least suggests that Parker would preempt antitrust scrutiny of
certain boycotts by insurance companies. The Court did "emphasize that the conduct with which
petitioners are charged appears to have occurred outside of any regulatory or cooperative arrange-
ment established by the laws of Rhode Island. There was no state authorization of the conduct in
question." Id. at 553. Later in its opinion, in describing the limits on its holding, the Court stated:
"Nor does our decision address insurance practices that are compelled or specifically authorized by
state regulatory policy." Id. at 555.
In a different context, in Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 233 n.41, the Court noted: "It might be
argued that some [provider] agreements are exempt from the antitrust laws under state-action ex-
emption . . . . But that exemption would exist because of the extent of state regulation and not
because the agreements are the 'business of insurance.' "
In Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977),
vacated, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 941 (1978), the court considered the applica-
bility of the Parker doctrine to insurance company conduct, but con6luded that the requirements for
its application were not satisfied. Id. at 304-08. Separately, the court noted that the conduct in-
volved the kind of boycott that is condemned by § 3(b) of McCarran-Ferguson. Id. at 309 n.18.
In Kartell v. Blue Shield, 592 F.2d 1191 (Ist Cir. 1979), the court noted the Parker issue, but
then decided that abstention was appropriate in view of concurrent state court litigation involving
related questions. After determination of certain certified questions by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, the district court found on remand that the Parker exemption was available for some
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Ballard v. Blue Shiel 364 defendants also argued that even if their conduct fell
within section 3(b), the state-action doctrine still was an available defense. Re-
jecting this argument, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
stated that Parker was inapplicable in light of the express prohibition in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act against insurance companies engaging in boycotts vio-
lative of the Sherman Act.365
Resolution of these conflicting views involves consideration of the policies
underlying two different statutes. On the one hand, there is evidence in the leg-
islative history of McCarran-Ferguson that its draftsmen did not intend to per-
mit the states to authorize activities that offended the boycott provision. 366 On
the other hand, Parker stands for the proposition that it was not the intent of
Congress in 1890 to apply the antitrust laws either to the activities of states or to
the acts of private individuals undertaken pursuant to the directives of a state.
If McCarran-Ferguson never had been enacted, the antitrust laws would
apply with the same force, both in a positive and a negative sense, to insurance
companies as to firms in other industries.3 67 That statute, of course, confers a
limited exemption on the "business of insurance," itself limited by section 3(b)
so as not to exempt boycotts by insurers. If Parker prohibits the application of
the antitrust laws to certain state-directed private activities, such as price fixing,
however, then the existence of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption should not
conduct of defendant insurers, but was unavailable for other conduct. Kartell v. Blue Shield, 542 F.
Supp. 782, 785-92 (D. Mass. 1982).
In First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 714 F.2d 1439, 1455 & n.16 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709 (1984), and Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Medical
Soc'y, 501 F. Supp. 970, 993 n.20 (S.D. Iowa 1980), the courts found that the Parker doctrine
shielded defendant insurers' conduct, and therefore they did not reach the McCarran-Ferguson
defense.
364. 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977).
365. The doctrine of Parker v. Brown deals with ascertaining the extent to which Congress
intended a state's displacement of competition to be exempt from the Sherman Act. Sec-
tion 1013(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act expresses congressional intention to subject
boycotts by insurance companies to the Sherman Act. Consequently, there can be nojusti-
fication for utilizing the principles of Parker v. Brown to impute a contrary intent to
Congress.
Id. at 1079.
366. The following exchange during the Conference Committee proceedings is illustrative:
Mr. FERGUSON: There are certain things which a state cannot interfere with. It cannot
interfere with the application of the Sherman Act to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or
intimidate, or any act of boycotting, coercion, or intimidation.
Mr. McCARRAN: Not at any time.
Mr. FERGUSON: Not at any time.
91 CONG. REC. 1443 (1945). Senator Ferguson later reiterated this view: "In other words, there are
six things on which a State cannot legislate. They are boycott, coercion, or intimidation, or agree-
ments to boycott, coerce, or intimidate." Id. at 1481; see also id. at 1483 (statement of Sen. Rad-
cliffe: "If [the states) should attempt to enact any laws which would permit boycotting or unjust
discrimination, this bill would intervene and prevent [it.").
367. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 562 (1944), the Court
hinted at what that treatment might be:
The argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many state laws regulat-
ing insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few states go as far as to permit private insurance
companies, without state supervision, to agree upon and fix uniform insurance rates. ...
No states authorize combinations of insurance companies to coerce, intimidate, and boy-
cott competitors and consumers in the manner here alleged ....
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impose a higher burden on insurers with respect to other activities, such as boy-
cotts. 368 Under Parker, the Sherman Act does not reach certain noninsurer boy-
cotts; the existence of McCarran-Ferguson should not expand the reach of the
Sherman Act with respect to this particular activity of insurance companies.
V. CONCLUSION
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed over four decades ago, in immedi-
ate response to the Supreme Court's landmark South-Eastern Underwriters deci-
sion. In an attempt to accommodate both the interests of the states and the
perceived needs of the insurance industry, the Act conferred a rather broad im-
munity from antitrust scrutiny on many of the activities of insurance companies.
Congress has not changed one word of the Act since then and it has been the
subject of only limited congressional reexamination. Since 1944, however, both
the national mood towards regulation and competition and the needs of the in-
surance industry have changed significantly. In a series of decisions beginning in
1978, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Act to limit the antitrust immunity
extended. Nonetheless, the general contours of the broad exemption for the in-
surance industry remain. In light of these developments, serious congressional
reconsideration of the need for, and the scope of, this exemption is needed.
368. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir.) ("while the antitrust laws were
made applicable by section 2(b) to insurance companies, the debates explicitly recognized the contin-
uing vitality of Parker v. Brown"), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 390 (1966).
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